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I.

INTRODUCTION

If the President makes decisions by default on national security, the
President’s only judges are the lawyers who provide the President with
advice.1 Because of threshold doctrines such as standing and political
questions, courts often do not encounter the most difficult and important
questions.2 Moreover, the President and Congress often develop a course of
dealing over time that settles the distribution of power between them.3 By
standing in for courts and interpreting both case law and the political
branches’ course of dealing, few lawyers practice with higher stakes than
those at the Justice Department’s elite Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).4
However, because of the stilted advice of OLC staffers in the eighteen
months after the September 11 attacks, few lawyers have received as much
criticism.5
A broad consensus has developed that the lawyers who provided
President Bush with legal advice in the aftermath of September 11 did not

1. See Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1448, 1460–68 (2010) [hereinafter Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC] (discussing particular features of
OLC).
2. See id. at 1480 n.132 (noting threshold doctrines of standing, ripeness, and mootness, which
limit adjudication on the merits).
3. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive
Power’ vested in the President . . . .”).
4. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 71–98 (2007); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal
Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2007); Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC,
supra note 1, at 1458–70; Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective
from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303 (2000); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The
Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676 (2005); see also
John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative,
Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 407–19 (1993) (discussing
the history of Attorney General opinions and OLC).
5. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 67, 80–85 (2005) (arguing that OLC lawyers contravened a settled public
understanding regarding interrogation).
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adequately consider the special responsibilities they had assumed.6 In
authorizing coercive interrogation techniques7 and a broad program of
warrantless surveillance without securing congressional approval,8 these
lawyers allowed the President to operate with minimal accountability and set
the stage for a pushback from Congress,9 the courts,10 and global public
opinion.11 Although more conscientious Bush Administration lawyers
withdrew some of the more sweeping memos after the initial period12 and
the Obama Administration has repudiated the rest,13 the question of who
controls legal advice to the President continues to spur controversy.
Commentators debate the appropriateness of sanctions for OLC lawyers14
and the design and substantive mandate of OLC.
6. For a discerning account by the lawyer and academic who withdrew a number of the
opinions generated in those early days, see GOLDSMITH, supra note 4. For other critical
commentary, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 95–110
(2010); HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR (2009); DAVID
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 162, 176–80, 200–02 (2007); Kathleen Clark, Ethical
Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 455 (2005);
Stephen Gillers, Legal Ethics: A Debate, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 236, 237–38 (Karen
J. Greenberg ed., 2006); Peter Margulies, True Believers at Law: National Security Agendas, the
Regulation of Lawyers, and the Separation of Powers, 68 MD. L. REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter
Margulies, True Believers]; Wendel, supra note 5; Fred C. Zacharias, Practice, Theory, and the War
on Terror, 59 EMORY L.J. 333, 338–48 (2009); cf. Norman W. Spaulding, Professional
Independence in the Office of the Attorney General, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1975–76 (2008)
[hereinafter Spaulding, Professional Independence] (arguing that the problems with OLC advice
stemmed from ideological allegiances of lawyers, not from timidity on the lawyers’ part).
7. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel
to President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1,
2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 172 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L.
Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter Bybee Memo].
8. See GABRIELLA BLUM & PHILIP B. HEYMANN, LAWS, OUTLAWS AND TERRORISTS: LESSONS
FROM THE WAR ON TERRORISM 54–56 (2010).
9. See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 220–23 (2007) (discussing the McCain Amendment,
which barred torture by the United States military).
10. See PETER MARGULIES, LAW’S DETOUR: JUSTICE DISPLACED IN THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 56–57 (2010). Initial revelations about abuses at Abu Ghraib were made on the
same day as oral argument in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), in which counsel for the
government had assured Justices that the government did not engage in torture. MARGULIES, supra,
at 56–57. The Court shortly thereafter required due process safeguards for detention of suspected
terrorists. Id.
11. See José E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 175, 215–21 (2006).
12. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 142–62.
13. See Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Withdrawal of Office
of Legal Counsel CIA Interrogation Opinions (Apr. 15, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/
olc/2009/withdrawalofficelegalcounsel.pdf.
14. See David D. Cole, The Sacrificial Yoo: Accounting for Torture in the OPR Report, 4 J.
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 455, 463 (2010) (calling for government commission); Claire
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The imposition of legal sanctions on John Yoo, the Berkeley law
professor who, as an OLC lawyer, authored the most controversial opinions,
remains unsettled. The Obama Administration completed an extensive
review of Yoo’s work by overruling a recommendation by one unit within
the Justice Department, the Office of Professional Responsibility, to refer
Yoo’s case to state ethics regulators for disciplinary action such as
suspension or disbarment.15 However, a Bivens suit that seeks damages
against Yoo remains alive in federal court.16
In addition, a substantial number of proposals have emerged for
reforming OLC and Executive Branch legal advice. Some of these
proposals, such as Bruce Ackerman’s recent call for a “Supreme Executive
Tribunal,”17 would change OLC’s structure to ensure the independence of
the advice received. Others seek to enhance deliberation within OLC by
requiring consideration of opposing views18 and outlining a regime of stare
decisis for OLC advice.19 Still others aim for substantive guidance, arguing

Finkelstein, When Government Lawyers Break the Law: The Case for Prosecution, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. PENNUMBRA 196 (2010), available at http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/
AuthorizingTorture.pdf (arguing for criminal prosecution); cf. George D. Brown, Accountability,
Liability, and the War on Terror—Constitutional Tort Suits as Truth and Reconciliation Vehicles, 63
FLA. L. REV. 193, 234–37 (2011) (warning of unintended consequences of truth commissions and
tort liability); Stephen I. Vladeck, Justice Jackson, the Memory of Internment, and the Rule of Law
After the Bush Administration, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW: THE RULE OF LAW AND
THE PROSECUTION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 183, 201–06 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain
eds., 2010) (discussing the appropriateness of formal versus informal sanctions).
15. See Office of Prof’l Responsibility, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation into the Office of
Legal Counsel’s Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of
“Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists (July 29, 2009) [hereinafter OPR
Report],
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf
(recommendation referring Yoo to state regulatory authorities); David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy
Att’y Gen., Memorandum for the Attorney General (Jan. 5, 2010), at 67 [hereinafter DOJ Final
Report], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemo100105.pdf
(rejecting OPR’s recommendation regarding Yoo).
16. See Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that Yoo’s claim
of qualified immunity did not require dismissal of lawsuit).
17. See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 143–50 (calling for the establishment of a “Supreme
Executive Tribunal”); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2336–40 (2006) [hereinafter Katyal, Internal
Separation of Powers] (proposing a quasi-adjudicative body as a replacement for OLC); Norman W.
Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism in the Department of Justice, 63 STAN. L. REV. 409,
435–39 (2011) [hereinafter Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism] (suggesting that
Congress restrict the President’s power to fire the OLC supervisor); see also Bruce Ackerman, Lost
Inside the Beltway: A Reply to Professor Morrison, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 13 (2011) (responding to
Morrison’s critique of proposals); cf. Pillard, supra note 4, at 748–58 (discussing other structural
reforms at OLC, including a role for the Justice Department’s Office of the Inspector General); Eric
A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 896–909 (2007)
[hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, The Credible Executive] (criticizing Katyal’s model as utopian, but
suggesting pragmatic substitutes such as bipartisan appointments).
18. See Johnsen, supra note 4.
19. See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1.
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that OLC lawyers should adhere to “mainstream” legal interpretations,20 but
suggesting that the President has the power to disregard such advice in
demonstrably exigent situations.21 Another cohort highlights more informal
modes of accountability, such as disclosure,22 that will allow Congress and
the public to appreciate the reasoning of Executive Branch lawyers.
This Article critiques such proposals, arguing that both formal sanctions
and structural reform yield unintended consequences. One problem is that
commentators proposing reforms fight the last war.23 They recite a
monolithic narrative that focuses on the dangers of executive overreaching,
but often exchange one species of myopia for another.24 Because of the
tenor of Bush Administration policy, critics neglect the far more varied
trajectory of executive power over time.25
The Bush Administration presents a simple case for critics of executive
power. President Bush and Vice President Cheney were confirmed
unilateralists, rending the fabric of separation of powers by refusing to
consult Congress.26 Moreover, on an issue such as coercive interrogation,
Bush Administration officials used that power to reduce human rights and
civil liberties here and abroad.27 However, prior Administrations have taken
actions that interact in a more complex way with both the separation of
powers and the framework of human rights.28 Prior to America’s entry into
World War II, for example, then-Attorney General Robert Jackson
authorized the destroyer deal, which aided Britain in its lonely fight against

20. See BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 54–56 (arguing that OLC must provide opinions
within the legal “mainstream”).
21. Id. at 55 (invoking the example of Jefferson and Lincoln); Gabriella Blum, The Role of the
Client: The President’s Role in Government Lawyering, 32 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 275, 281
(2009) (arguing that the executive must assume responsibility for doing what is right even if her
lawyers disagree); cf. OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS:
EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 123–27 (2006) (analyzing Jefferson’s view as a
rationale for “extra-legal” action by the President); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses
to Violent Crisis Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1099–109 (2003) (same). For
further discussion of Gross’s view, see Noa Ben-Asher, Legalism and Decisionism in Crisis, 71
OHIO ST. L.J. 699, 714–15 (2010).
22. Gross, supra note 21, at 1099–109; Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How Transparency
of Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists Win, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 579, 602–05
(2009).
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See MARGULIES, supra note 10, at 8–10.
27. See Setty, supra note 22, at 589–94.
28. See infra notes 295–314 and accompanying text.
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Nazi Germany.29 Jackson’s interpretive style in the opinion foreshadowed
John Yoo’s by straining statutes to the breaking point.30 However, Jackson’s
advice was part of a public debate that led, within months, to the Lend Lease
Act, which codified aid to Britain.31 Moreover, the substance of Jackson’s
advice also invoked a post-war international order with greater protections
against aggression and genocide.32 More recently, President Clinton
exercised power to promote human rights, through the NATO intervention in
Kosovo.33 Clinton’s unilateralism may have been as deplorable as Bush’s;
or it could have been commendable on its own terms, but worth curbing to
protect the separation of powers. However, critics of the Bush-era OLC
rarely even consider such questions.34
Problems await any response to the excesses of the Bush Administration
OLC. As critics of the Bush Administration have noted, an absence of
sanctions risks impunity for official overreaching and discourages officials
However, formal legal
from crafting more tempered alternatives.35
sanctions, such as disbarment or damages, also create problems. Formal
legal sanctions can trigger procedural injustices, such as a lack of notice, that
a nation guided by the rule of law should prevent.36 Sanctions and structural
reforms can crowd out courses of dealing between the political branches that
have traditionally promoted flexibility in foreign and domestic affairs.37
Finally, constraining OLC can also increase polarization, as a President
inclined toward unilateralism bypasses OLC altogether and seeks advice
from other government lawyers without OLC’s pedigree of balance and
discernment.38
To avoid these problems, reform should center on maintaining an ethic
of dialogic equipoise.39 All lawyers need to maintain a balance between
serving a client and preserving the integrity of the legal system.40 Lawyers

29. See Acquisition of Naval & Air Bases in Exch. for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 Op. Att’y Gen.
484, 486–88 (1940) [hereinafter Jackson op.]; cf. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S
PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 93–103 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003) (discussing the context
of the destroyer deal).
30. See Jackson op., supra note 29, at 494–96 (interpreting very narrowly a statute making it
unlawful for the United States to send any vessel of war to a belligerent nation).
31. See An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States (Lend-Lease Act), Pub. L. No. 7711, § 3(b), 55 Stat. 31, 32 (1941).
32. See Jonathan A. Bush, “The Supreme . . . Crime” and its Origins: The Lost Legislative
History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2324, 2365–66 (2002).
33. See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 548–49 (2d ed. 2009).
34. See infra Part III.A.2.
35. See infra Part II.A.
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. See infra Part II.C.
38. See infra Part II.D.
39. See Margulies, True Believers, supra note 6, at 66–67.
40. See id.
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in the Executive Branch face the same challenge.41 If they unduly discount
the interests of the President, they risk being cut out of the loop.42
Cumbersome adjudicative models have this failing—the President can leave
the structure unused, like a stately mansion which no one can afford to
maintain.43 However, a failure to situate the President in the overall
constitutional fabric can render the President’s initiatives unsustainable.44
For this precarious balance to work, lawyers need to encourage dialog within
the Executive Branch, among the other branches, and with the public.45
Dialogic equipoise entails four factors for OLC opinions that expand
presidential power. First, the action authorized must have a compelling
sovereignty- or human rights-centered rationale that prevents irreparable
harm or exploits a fleeting opportunity.46 Second, the action must present a
reasonable likelihood of ratification by Congress.47 Third, the action cannot
violate any other constitutional norms, such as those found in the Bill of
Rights or the Equal Protection Clause.48 Fourth, and most controversially,
advice authorizing an expansive view of presidential power must fit within a
numerical cap that budgets OLC’s institutional capital.49
This Article is divided into five parts. Part II, which addresses the risks
and benefits of reform strategies, suggests that overly timid reforms risk a
climate of impunity, while heedless or hasty reforms can upset reliance
interests and yield paralysis or polarization.50 Part III focuses on the OLC
interrogation opinions and discusses the virtues and vices of formal
sanctions like disbarment and damages.51 It concludes that while OLC’s
opinions richly merit condemnation, formal sanctions would violate
principles of notice and discount a history of aggressive interpretation that
dates back to the Founding Era. Part IV analyzes structural fixes for OLC,
including Ackerman’s Supreme Executive Tribunal.52 It pinpoints the
constitutional and policy problems of structural reforms, which combine the
disadvantages of courts and executive departments. Part V, which traces

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See id. at 66.
See id.
See infra text accompanying notes 199–203.
See infra notes 189–96 and accompanying text.
See Margulies, True Believers, supra note 6, at 67.
See infra Part VI.A.
See infra pp. 853–54.
See infra note 294 and accompanying text.
See infra Part VI.C.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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substantive and deliberative reforms, argues that requiring a purely objective
analysis unaffected by Executive Branch interests produces unduly rigid
legal advice.53 Deliberative reforms, such as a commitment to disclosure,
consultation with other government agencies, and stare decisis, are more
promising. Finally, Part VI advances a model of dialogic equipoise that
husbands OLC’s institutional capital and elicits executive decisions that are
both disciplined and effective.54
II. REFORM’S RISKS AND REWARDS
Any effort to move beyond institutional failures such as the OLC
memos on interrogation entails several risks. The absence of sanctions can
embolden future Executives to overreach.55 However, an eagerness to
impose sanctions can vitiate procedural justice.56 Sanctions and structural
reforms can induce paralysis or even prompt polarization.57 Workable
reforms must navigate through these obstacles.
A. The Hazards of Impunity
Failed or timid reform can foster a climate of impunity which attaches
no cost to former officials’ overreaching. This can send the unhealthy
message that overreaching is regrettable but that officials need not go out of
their way to avoid it. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,58 for example, the Court held that
senior federal officials could not be liable for failing to properly supervise
subordinates who engaged in abuse of post-9/11 immigration detainees,59
even if the defendants knew of the abuse.60 In his opinion for the majority,
Justice Kennedy described the roundup of undocumented Muslim
noncitizens after September 11 as a “legitimate policy directing law
enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part II.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C–D.
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009).
See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS, 10–17 (2003),
http://usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf [hereinafter OIG Sept. 11 Report]. The claims in the case
arose from a roundup that targeted undocumented aliens from the Middle East and South Asia. See
id. For a discussion of profiling and counterterrorism policy, see DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS
SAFE, LESS FREE: WHY AMERICA IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 30–31 (2007) (discussing the
post-9/11 roundup); MARGULIES, supra note 10, at 28–30. Cf. Stephen J. Ellmann, Racial Profiling
and Terrorism, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 675 (2002–2003) (discussing profiling techniques).
60. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952 (finding that officials “cannot be held liable unless they
themselves acted on account of a constitutionally protected characteristic” (emphasis added)).
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to the attacks.”61 The government’s own report portrayed the roundup as far
more chaotic, characterized by wholesale arrests of undocumented aliens
with no demonstrable connection to terrorism.62 However, the tangled
doctrinal basis for the Court’s holding, which conflated supervisory and
respondeat superior liability,63 demonstrated that the Court was unduly eager
to insulate Executive Branch officials from the foreseeable consequences of
their actions.
B. Procedural Injustice and the Rule of Law
Procedural injustice is another risk of transitions. Many transitions from
overreaching crystallize understandings about what constitutes illegal
conduct.64 Prior to that crystallization, however, ambiguity surrounds the
relevant law.65 Interpretations of the law that resolve ambiguity in favor of a
defendant uphold the “fundamental principle” of legality: “[N]o citizen
should be held accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are
uncertain, or subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed.”66
Unfortunately, fair notice is often a casualty of the popular outcry for
punishment of officials who have allegedly overreached.67 Overreaching

61. Id. at 1951.
62. See OIG Sept. 11 Report, supra note 59, at 16–17 (reporting that agents received over
96,000 leads, including one asserting only that the target worked in a grocery store “‘operated by
numerous Middle Eastern men’”).
63. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (asserting that the case was governed by the principle that, in
lawsuits seeking damages for constitutional violations, “masters [should] not answer for the torts of
their servants”). However, the supervisory liability theory advanced by the Iqbal plaintiffs required
a showing of recklessness by those in charge. Id. at 1952. In contrast, under respondeat superior,
even non-negligent principals are liable for their agents’ torts. Id. at 1958 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2005)). Appellate courts had repeatedly held that
supervisory recklessness could trigger liability. See Int’l Action Ctr. v. United States, 365 F.3d 20,
28 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“‘The supervisor[] must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it,
condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.’” (quoting Jones v. City of Chi., 856
F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988))).
64. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117
HARV. L. REV. 761, 791–800 (2004) [hereinafter Posner & Vermeule, Transitional Justice]
(discussing retroactive justice after regime changes, and the procedural legality of punishing the old
regime under the new regime’s laws).
65. See id.
66. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008). International law has traditionally
attached great importance to legality as a principle. See DAVID LUBAN, JULIE R. O’SULLIVAN &
DAVID P. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL AND CRIMINAL LAW 14–15 (2010) (discussing legal principles
requiring fair notice that conduct violates the law).
67. See Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda’s
Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 616–17 (1998) (discussing problems
with notice in genocide prosecutions).
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officials’ eager embrace of procedural rights that they blithely deny others
deserves a chapter all of its own in the annals of legal irony.68 However,
procedural rights do not merely benefit those who invoke them. Like other
measures that we can justify on rule-utilitarian grounds, they benefit society,
even when the case for exceptions seems compelling.69 As Hamilton noted,
the prospect of judicial enforcement of rights prompts emerging majorities
and their representatives to “qualify their attempts” at shortcuts around the
rule of law.70 Ignoring notice undermines this salutary check, even when
poetic justice identifies sanctions’ targets.
C. Reform and Paralysis
Another problem is paralysis. Hindsight bias makes it easy to secondguess officials for actions that may seem hasty or shortsighted from the
convenient perch of retrospect, but were in fact difficult decisions made with
a sparse menu of options.71 Officials fearful of subsequent second-guessing
may become unduly risk averse, taking no action when action is needed.72
Because of the need to avoid paralysis in national security matters,
informal courses of dealing between the branches have often been
substituted for more formal sources of authority. Justice Jackson noted in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer that “congressional inertia,
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter,
enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.”73
68. See Stephen Holmes, The Spider’s Web: How Government Lawbreakers Routinely Elude the
Law, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 121, 141 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2010) (describing this
tendency as “irritating”).
69. See Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation,
106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2022–23 (1997) (addressing the need for justice and fairness to establish
equality under the law, even if some criminals go unpunished).
70. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
71. Conferring qualified immunity on officials helps mitigate the ill-effects of hindsight bias.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusion About
Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 338–39 (1993)
(analyzing judicial efforts to balance constitutional rights and official discretion in damages actions).
See generally Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our Servants: The Courts, Congress, and the Liability of
Public Officials for Damages, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 281 (arguing that damages actions can produce
undue official risk aversion).
72. See Schuck, supra note 71, at 299–301.
73. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring); see also id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing legislative
acquiescence as triggering judicial deference); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)
(upholding presidential negotiation of claims settlement with Iran); United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (upholding the power of the President, in a case involving congressional
acquiescence, to safeguard federal land for conservation and orderly development); cf. WILLIAM C.
BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE POWER OF THE PURSE 121–
29 (1994) (discussing what authors call “customary national security law”); HAROLD H. BRUFF,
BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 102–05 (2006)

818

DO NOT DELETE

[Vol. 39: 809, 2012]

4/20/2012 1:25 PM

Reforming Lawyers into Irrelevance
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

At key junctures, officials pushed the envelope of formal legal authority and
subsequently sought congressional or public ratification for their efforts.74
Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation is perhaps the earliest example.75
Washington interpreted a treaty with France in a narrow manner that kept
America out of foreign conflicts, using presidential authority in a manner
that seems prudent in retrospect but was controversial at the time.76 Since
then, presidents from Jefferson to Clinton have taken the initiative to
preserve the status quo and to advance emerging norms of individual and
human rights with the expectation that Congress would ratify their choices.77
A rule that minimized overreaching but impaired this flexible course of
dealing would exalt form over functionality.78
D. Polarization and Reform’s Reversal
Polarization can be an additional ill-effect of attempted reforms. Undue
emphasis on formal sanctions can cause this phenomenon. So can structural
reforms that make legal advice too cumbersome to obtain.
The challenges faced by transitions from dictatorship abroad
demonstrate that a rigid focus on formal legal sanctions can undermine the
new regime.79 Those out of power believe that sanctions amount to “victor’s

(discussing Midwest Oil); Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1498 (arguing “that
within OLC, its own body of executive power precedents is a critical piece of the broader historical
practice informing its understanding of the law”); Curtis A., Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison,
Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999516 (arguing that historical patterns of acquiescence are a legitimate
basis for constitutional interpretation, but that some caveats apply).
74. See BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 20 (citing urgency as a justification for executive
action before legislative approval).
75. George Washington, Proclamation of Neutrality (Apr. 22, 1793), reprinted in 32 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745–1799, at
430–31 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
76. See Martin S. Flaherty, The Story of the Neutrality Controversy: Struggling Over
Presidential Power Outside the Courts, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 21, 29–39 (Christopher H.
Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
77. See BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 55 (alluding to the Louisiana Purchase); id. at 45
(discussing Kosovo intervention).
78. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1170, 1209–10 (2007) (noting the need for the Executive to be able to enact flexible responses to
rapidly changing circumstances). But see Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the
Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783 (2011) (arguing that a functional
view leads to undue deference).
79. See Posner & Vermeule, Transitional Justice, supra note 64, at 769 (noting the ill-effects of
rigid adherence).
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justice,” and lose any stake in transition’s success.80 The ancient Athenians
discovered this to their chagrin, as their government moved from oligarchy
to democracy four times within eight years.81 After an initial round of
sanctions against the oligarchs proved counterproductive, Athenian
democrats opted for a reconciliation brokered by Sparta.82 More recent
transitions in Eastern Europe83 and Iraq84 have exhibited the same tendency.
For this reason, pragmatism has informed approaches to criminal
prosecution of overreaching officials in the United States. Lincoln declined
to prosecute most officials of the Confederacy, asserting that formal
sanctions such as penalties for treason would impair reconciliation.85 Later,
President Ford pardoned President Nixon, and presidents have pardoned
others in the national security apparatus.86 Moreover, the one institutional
effort to promote prosecution of American officials was a clear failure.87
According to a bipartisan consensus, the Independent Counsel statute,
enacted in the wake of Watergate, criminalized political disputes and thereby

80. See Gene Bykhovsky, An Argument Against Assertion of Universal Jurisdiction by
Individual States, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 161, 181 (2003) (citing the lack of credibility in “victor’s
justice,” and the risks of pursuing criminal prosecutions in a new regime).
81. See JON ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 4–22 (2004).
82. Id. at 21.
83. See Denise V. Powers & James H. Cox, Echoes from the Past: The Relationship Between
Satisfaction with Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 617,
628 (1997) (discussing popular disillusionment yielded by stress in rooting out former Communist
functionaries).
84. See Jeremy Sarkin & Heather Sensibaugh, How Historical Events and Relationships Shape
Current Attempts at Reconciliation in Iraq, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1033, 1064–65 (2009) (noting that the
initial American policy of rooting out Ba’athists from the government had ruinous results, turning
many Iraqis toward armed opposition to United States efforts). But see MICHAEL A. NEWTON &
MICHAEL P. SCHARF, ENEMY OF THE STATE: THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
181–83 (2008) (praising some post-Saddam Iraqi prosecutions, including the case of Judge Awad alBandar, which constituted the first conviction since the post-World War II era of a judge for
violating human rights).
85. See DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 100–01 (2003) (discussing the clear legal
basis for treason prosecutions of Confederate officials and combatants, which never occurred).
86. See Kathleen Clark, Government Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1033, 1040 n.21 (2007) (discussing President Reagan’s pardon of Mark Felt, an FBI official who had
authorized warrantless searches and had also, unbeknownst to Reagan, been “Deep Throat,”
Woodward and Bernstein’s legendary source for stories about the Watergate scandal). In the early
Cold War period, covert operatives and interrogators apparently received advance pardons for
activities that might otherwise have triggered prosecution.
See also JOHN T. PARRY,
UNDERSTANDING TORTURE 142–45 (2010) (discussing Cold War interrogation tactics, conducted
with the consent of senior officials); William Ranney Levi, Interrogation’s Law, 118 YALE L.J.
1434, 1465–67 (2009) (noting that President Truman provided a standing pardon to CIA Director
Walter Bedell Smith for the CIA’s use of consciousness-altering chemicals and other techniques on
putative Soviet defectors and other subjects).
87. See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591–599 (2006).
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polarized political debate.88 For example, during the investigation of the
Monica Lewinsky episode,89 political opponents cast President Clinton’s
moves against al Qaeda as a “wag the dog” strategy to change the subject.90
The nation’s interest in an effective approach to al Qaeda suffered.
Structural reform can also exacerbate polarization. The President need
not seek OLC’s advice, if doing so creates undue disruption or delay.91
When seeking advice from OLC becomes too cumbersome, a president will
seek advice from lawyers who are closer at hand, including the White House
Counsel. Policy blunders have proliferated when insular power players have
shut out sources of advice within the Executive Branch. During the Reagan
Administration, the primary actors in the Iran-Contra affair froze out the
Office of the Legal Adviser in the State Department.92 The second Bush
Administration established a “working group” to assess interrogation
techniques, but then bypassed most of the group’s members.93 Champions

88. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A FIRST
HAND ACCOUNT 135 (1991) (discussing congressional Democrats’ efforts to criminalize stance on
access to government documents by then-OLC head Ted Olson); Daniel C. Richman & William J.
Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 591, 598 (2005) (discussing Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s
investigation of Bill Clinton). Mutual realization of the statute’s noxious effects led Congress to
allow it to sunset. See 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994) (providing that the Independent Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1994 expires five years after the date of enactment).
89. See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 88.
90. See Todd S. Purdum, U.S. Fury on 2 Continents: Congress; Critics of Clinton Support
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at A1 (quoting Republican Senators Dan Coats of Indiana and
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania as expressing skepticism about the purpose and timing of attacks on a
suspected al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan).
91. See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 437,
449 (1993) (noting that the President “has the authority . . . to make his own legal determinations
without consulting any particular lawyer”).
92. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Reagan and Bush Administrations—Abraham D. Sofaer (1985–
1990), in SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 65, 80–81 (Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams eds.,
2010) (noting that the Iran-Contra affair “seriously damaged” the Administration’s antiterrorism
program).
93. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, 110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE
TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY 131 (Comm. Print 2008), available at
http://armed-services.senate.gov/Publications/Detainee%20Report%20Final_April%2022%202009.pdf.
Republican Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, one of the legislators who subsequently
investigated the evolution of the Administration’s policy on interrogation, observed that if group
members did not see the work product, “I’m not so sure that’s much of a working group.” Panel III of
a Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee: Origins of Aggressive Interrogation
Techniques, 110th Cong., FED. NEWS SERVICE, June 17, 2008. See generally MARGULIES, supra
note 10, at 61 (discussing how bureaucratic allies of Vice President Cheney and his counsel David
Addington, including William Haynes, general counsel at the Department of Defense, froze out
potential critics).
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of unilateral presidential power will always feel the urge to go it alone, but
complicating the search for legal advice will intensify this trend.94
III. SANCTIONING OLC LAWYERS: THE ALLURE AND UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES OF POETIC JUSTICE
To blunt impunity, some commentators have urged formal sanctions
against former OLC lawyer John Yoo.95 Formal sanctions would send a
strong message that such lawyering disserves the national interest.
However, formal sanctions may violate principles of procedural justice and
chill future decisions.96
To examine the merits of formal sanctions, a quick look at Yoo’s work
product is useful. Yoo’s advice on coercive interrogation displayed
problems of process and substance. The advice emerged from a closed
process driven by Vice President Cheney and Cheney’s legal alter ego,
David Addington, without public disclosure or wide discussion within the
Executive Branch.97 Indeed, other attorneys were methodically cut out of
the process.98 Moreover, Yoo’s legal conclusions were extraordinarily

94. JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS
TIMES 314 (2007) (“Lawyers are not always invited into the decision-making room” because of
“concerns about secrecy, delay, and ‘lawyer creep’ . . . whereby one legal question becomes
seventeen, requiring not one lawyer but forty-three to answer.”). An effort to streamline decisionmaking may account for the tendency in Republican Administrations to set up detours around career
bureaucrats, whom senior officials regard as Democrats eager to derail Republican initiatives. See
FRIED, supra note 88, at 154–55 (discussing perceived intractability of “permanent government”);
MARGULIES, supra note 10, at 10 (arguing that for Vice President Cheney, “dissenters within the
bureaucracy were either displaying a craven ‘cover your behind’ attitude or engaging in stealthy
ideological warfare”); SAVAGE, supra note 9, at 281–86 (discussing efforts in the first and second
Bush Administrations to control bureaucracy); cf. Cassandra Burke Robertson, Beyond the Torture
Memos: Perceptual Filters, Cultural Commitments, and Partisan Identity, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L
L. 389 (2009) (discussing links between accountability for excesses of previous regime and partisan
interactions).
95. See Nasser Hussain & Austin Sarat, Introduction: Responding to Government Lawlessness:
What Does the Rule of Law Require?, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW: THE RULE OF
LAW AND THE PROSECUTION OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 1, 19 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain
eds., 2010) (asserting that the diplomatic efforts by the Obama Administration may be unavailing
“without some measure of accountability for crimes, particularly torture”); Finkelstein, supra note
14.
96. See infra pp. 824–26, 829–32.
97. See BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 56–57 (noting how Addington refused to make
OLC opinions available to the NSA).
98. See id. at 18–19; MARGULIES, supra note 10, at 61. As a group, military lawyers sought to
push back against this dynamic; perhaps they were aware of reciprocal risks that an unduly
aggressive posture could pose for United States military personnel. Civilian decision makers
resented the military’s scruples. Compare Michael L. Kramer & Michael N. Schmitt, Lawyers on
Horseback? Thoughts on Judge Advocates and Civil-Military Relations, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1407
(2008) (arguing for robust dialogue between military lawyers and civilian officials on issues such as
procedural safeguards in military tribunals), and Gregory S. McNeal, Organizational Culture,
Professional Ethics and Guantánamo, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 125, 126–34 (2009) (praising a
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aggressive. For example, consider Yoo’s interpretation of the torture
statute,99 which Congress passed to implement the United States’ obligations
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT).100 Yoo
interpreted the statute, which prohibits conduct “specifically intended” to
inflict severe pain, as requiring proof that an interrogator had inflicted pain
for its own sake, not for another purpose such as gaining information.101
Yoo also used unrelated health care statutes102 to define “severe pain” as
pain associated with organ failure and other critical health conditions.103
Given this backdrop, harm that fell short of being life threatening was
outside the torture statute’s scope.104 Justifying these narrow constructions,
Yoo invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance.105 The torture statute
would be unconstitutional, Yoo argued, if it failed to provide the President
with latitude.106 Yoo’s approach clashed with interpretations that fit the
remedial purpose of the statute and CAT. Yoo’s strained arguments were a
case study in lawyering for the short term and cost the United States dearly
in global good will when they came to light almost two years later.107

culture of resistance to political influence within the military), with Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo,
Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military: A Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror,
54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1820–23 (2007) (portraying military lawyers who opposed Bush
Administration policies on detention and interrogation as entrenched members of bureaucracy).
99. See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006).
100. See United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/708 (Dec. 10, 1984)
[hereinafter CAT].
101. See Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 174–75.
102. E.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1369 (2006) (allowing federal reimbursement only for hospital care
provided to undocumented aliens with emergency medical conditions).
103. Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 176.
104. Id. at 176–77.
105. See id. at 202–04.
106. See id.; cf. Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1229–30 (2006) [hereinafter Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance] (critiquing
Yoo’s view as encouraging Executive Branch self-dealing).
107. See David Luban & Henry Shue, Mental Torture: A Critique of Erasures in U.S. Law, 100
GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1797806 (arguing that the U.S.
interpretation of “mental torture” is problematic under international law). See generally Robert M.
Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1412–18 (2009) (discussing
institutional barriers to sound decision-making within the Executive Branch). The amount of useful
information yielded by the techniques that Yoo authorized, such as waterboarding, continues to be
the subject of debate. See Philip Zelikow, A Dubious C.I.A. Shortcut, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2009, at
A27 (noting that a former State Department official and director of the 9/11 Commission, Philip
Zelikow, suggested that intelligence reports derived from interrogations of alleged 9/11 mastermind
Khalid Shaikh Mohamed and two others, using “enhanced” techniques, “were a critical part of the
intelligence flow, but rarely—if ever—affected a ‘ticking bomb’ situation”).
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A. Ethical Sanctions as a Remedy for Overreaching
Professional discipline seemed at first blush like an appropriate and
even necessary remedy for the myopia that Yoo displayed.108 However,
transforming Yoo from a resoundingly negative example into a subject of
professional discipline requires more. Professional discipline, such as
disbarment, could trigger the problems of paralysis and polarization
discussed above.109 Moreover, state sanctions like disbarment rest on
observance of procedural rights, such as notice and a right to be heard,
which Yoo did not relinquish through his blithe dismissal of the rights of
others. Impatience with those rights merely takes a page from Yoo’s
book.110
DOJ’s Final Report correctly noted problems with professional
discipline that Yoo’s accusers have ignored. First, two of the guides to
professional conduct which Yoo allegedly violated were drafted after his
conduct occurred;111 fairness precluded applying these norms to Yoo’s case.
Second, Yoo’s conclusions were more tempered and the underlying law
more ambiguous than Yoo’s accusers have acknowledged.112 Third, Yoo’s
aggressive interpretive method echoed earlier advice in the canon of national
security law, including Attorney General Jackson’s opinion authorizing the
destroyer deal with Britain.113

108. Indeed, while the Department of Justice (DOJ) ultimately decided against a referral to state
ethics regulators, the DOJ Final Report criticized Yoo in terms rarely applied to lawyers for the
federal government, acknowledging that Yoo’s “loyalty to his own ideology” had inspired advice
embodying “extreme . . . views of executive power.” DOJ Final Report, supra note 15, at 67.
Integrating short- and long-term perspectives may be particularly important for the government
lawyer, since any official seeking advice is in some sense an agent for the polity as a whole. That
integration is necessary, regardless of the identity of the client the lawyer is advising. For analyses
of what turns on identification of the government lawyer’s client, see Keith A. Petty, Professional
Responsibility Compliance and National Security Attorneys: Adopting the Normative Framework of
Ethical Legal Process 8–13 (June 30, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1632945 (arguing that identifying the precise client is often not central
because of overarching themes in national security advice). Cf. Steven K. Berenson, Public
Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41
B.C. L. REV. 789 (2000) (arguing that government lawyers have a duty to serve the public interest);
Nelson Lund, The President as Client and the Ethics of the President’s Lawyers, 61 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 65, 66–67 (1998) (arguing that government lawyers lack the authority to second-guess their
clients’ choices on grounds of morality or policy); Geoffrey P. Miller, Government Lawyers’ Ethics
in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1295–97 (1987) (same); Zacharias,
supra note 6, at 338–48 (arguing that questions about the role of public interest in legal advice occur
for attorneys in both private and public employment).
109. See supra Part II.C–D.
110. See JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR
152–54 (2006) (asserting that according detainees due process rights, including the right to a lawyer
and a hearing, would interfere with the government’s counterterrorism efforts).
111. DOJ Final Report, supra note 15, at 15–16.
112. See id. at 35–38.
113. Id. at 19.
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1. Notice, Time, and the Legality of Sanctions
Imposition of sanctions on Yoo would have dented a centerpiece of the
rule of law: the proposition that individuals can only be punished for
violating laws in effect at the time of their conduct.114 In Yoo’s case,
understanding this problem of legality merely requires a nod at the calendar.
The OPR report, recommending a referral to state ethics regulators, relied on
two ethics guides for government lawyers.115 However, neither of those
guides existed when Yoo issued the principal opinions that formed the basis
for the referral recommendation. The guides that did not exist included a
memorandum from OLC on “best practices” from May 2005,116 almost three
years after Yoo had submitted his memo, and a similar list of principles from
former OLC lawyers announced in December 2004.117 Broadly speaking,
each guide urged that lawyers for OLC disclose and discuss opposing
arguments.118 This is a sound and sensible practice, anchored in the
importance of careful deliberation. However, to transform prudent practice
into an enforceable norm, the guides would have had to have been available
to Yoo at the time he finalized his advice.
Moreover, Yoo had expressly modified an extreme position because of
opposing arguments. Yoo added a significant hedge to his conclusion that
liability hinged on proof of intent to cause severe pain for its own sake.119
At the urging of Michael Chertoff, who was then head of the Justice
Department’s Criminal Division and would later become the Secretary of
Homeland Security,120 Yoo warned that whatever the interrogator’s motive,
a jury could infer intent from any technique that a reasonable person would
view as causing severe pain.121 An overzealous interrogator might have
pondered Yoo’s warning and still taken his chances. However, imposing the
burden of uncertainty at trial on the interrogator is precisely what critics of

114. See United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008).
115. See OPR Report, supra note 15, at 21–24.
116. See Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., to
Attorneys of the Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Best Practices for OLC Opinions (May 16, 2005).
117. See Johnsen, supra note 4, at 1602–10 (reprinting principles).
118. See id. at 1605 (“OLC’s analysis should disclose, and candidly and fairly address, the
relevant range of legal sources and substantial arguments on all sides of the question.”).
119. See Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 174–75.
120. See DOJ Final Report, supra note 15, at 66.
121. See Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 175 (noting that “as a matter of practice in the federal
criminal justice system it is highly unlikely that a jury would acquit” when a reasonable person
would view a given interrogation method as causing severe pain to a detainee).
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the Bush Administration’s policy sought,122 and clearly does not provide the
legal cover which critics rightly deplore.
Imposing formal sanctions on Yoo despite this caveat would also
present significant problems of notice.
The OPR Report, which
recommended a referral to state ethics regulators, asserted that Yoo’s caveat
was “insufficient.”123 However, OPR failed to articulate what additional
caveats Yoo could have included.124 Indeed, in the course of a 260-page
report, OPR did not even provide a verbatim account of Yoo’s warning.125 If
fairness requires attending to facts, Yoo deserved a more methodical
accounting.
The vague and untested scope of binding authority compounds this
fairness problem. In recommending that Yoo be referred to state ethics
regulators, OPR relied on American Bar Association Model Rule 2.1, which
states that a lawyer “shall exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice.”126 However, courts have viewed Rule 2.1 solely as a
makeweight. Regulators have interpreted this rule as a generic restatement
of more specific norms, such as the rules against dishonesty127 and conflicts
of interest.128 Cases citing the provision involve lawyers who swindled their
own clients.129 None involve a lawyer like Yoo, whose ideological blinders

122. See Elaine Scarry, Five Errors in the Reasoning of Alan Dershowitz, in TORTURE: A
COLLECTION 281, 282 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004) (rejecting blanket impunity and Dershowitz’s
proposal for “torture warrants,” and arguing that in a case where the infliction of severe pain
demonstrably averted a catastrophe, the interrogator “would have to rely on convincing a jury of
peers that the context for the act was exceptional”); cf. Michael W. Lewis, A Dark Descent into
Reality: Making the Case for an Objective Definition of Torture, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 77, 86–87
(2010) (arguing that the “ticking time bomb” scenario is too rare to provide a basis for law or
policy); Kim Lane Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in the “War on Terrorism,” 1 J. NAT’L
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 285 (2005) (same).
123. OPR Report, supra note 15, at 175.
124. Yoo also added a caveat to his analogy to federal health care statutes that define “severe
pain” as equivalent to the pain an individual would suffer during “death, organ failure, or the
permanent impairment of a significant body function.” Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 176 (noting
that health care statutes “address a substantially different subject”).
125. See generally OPR Report, supra note 15.
126. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2011); cf. Clark, supra note 6 (discussing
the relevance of Rule 2.1); Steven Giballa, Saving the Law from the Office of Legal Counsel, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 845, 845 (2009) (arguing that “Rule 2.1 should be interpreted to prohibit
OLC lawyers from providing legal opinions . . . that advocate for unorthodox interpretations of the
law,” and that they should be required “to provide what they believe to be the best, rather than a
merely plausible, view of the law”).
127. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2011) (defining lawyer misconduct to
include “dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation”).
128. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2011) (prohibiting conflict between an
interest of the client and “a personal interest of the lawyer,” unless the lawyer reasonably believes
she can provide competent representation and the client gives informed consent in writing).
129. See, e.g., In re Coffey’s Case, 880 A.2d 403 (N.H. 2005) (describing a series of acts in
which a lawyer bilked his client out of property); In re Harper, 571 S.E.2d 292, 293 (S.C. 2002) (a
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drove over-identification with client wishes. Admittedly, Rule 2.1 is a
useful guideline, particularly in its encouragement of lawyer advice on
“moral, economic, social and political factors.”130 However, targeting Yoo’s
2002 advice with a fresh pivot from the rule’s precatory pedigree to a newly
robust conception would engender serious notice concerns.
The relevant substantive legal authority is also vague. Critics of Yoo
rightly point out that the techniques Yoo authorized surely constitute “cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment” under international law.131 However,
critics fail to acknowledge international law’s demarcation between harsh
treatment, which states may use in an emergency, and torture, which is
categorically prohibited. In a case dealing with interrogation methods used
by Britain to seek information about violent acts against civilians planned by
the Irish Republican Army, the European Court of Human Rights held that
techniques such as use of stress positions and sleep deprivation did not
constitute torture.132 Israel’s High Court of Justice, while interposing strict
regulation of similar methods, did not categorically rule out their use.133
Customary international law is moving gradually toward a consensus that
even cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment should be categorically
prohibited; but this consensus is not complete.134 While the United Nations
General Assembly favors this view,135 the pervasive politics of that body

case in which a lawyer with a substantial interest in a company in which his client had invested
heavily did not inform the client of the company’s financial difficulties).
130. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2011).
131. See CAT, supra note 100, at pmbl. (noting the parties’ desire to aid “struggle against torture
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment”); cf. JEREMY WALDRON, TORTURE, TERROR, AND
TRADE-OFFS: PHILOSOPHY FOR THE WHITE HOUSE 204–05 (2010) (arguing that the notice argument
is not persuasive because even conduct short of torture would still entail deliberate imposition of
suffering).
132. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
133. See HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel 53(4) PD 817 [1999],
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999).
134. Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture requires that states shall “undertake to
prevent” cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, and imposes a number of duties on signatories to
achieve this goal, including education of officials, monitoring of practices, investigation, and access
to the courts. See CAT, supra note 100, at 198. However, the CAT does not bar exceptions to the
rule against cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, although it does so expressly in the case of
torture. Id. at 197.
135. See, e.g., Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A.
Res. 64/153, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/153 (Dec. 18, 2009); see also Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute
Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate Sanctions, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1535, 1535–
37 (2009) (discussing General Assembly resolutions in the course of asserting that prohibition of
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment is a jus cogens norm that allows no derogation or
exception).
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limit its usefulness as a guide to the state of the law.136 Recent case law
perpetuates this uncertainty.137
United States courts do not further the cause of clarity, since there are
no decisions on the meaning of the torture statute. Indeed, the statute has
not produced a single prosecution of an American official. Therefore, courts
have had no occasion to interpret its terms.138 The Justice Department’s own
guidelines require intentional or reckless violation of an “unambiguous”
norm.139 Yoo’s advice did not rise to that level.

136. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
102, rptr. n.2 (1986) (noting only that General Assembly Resolutions “in some circumstances
contribute to the process of making customary law”); see also STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY,
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006), reprinted in HENKIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 194–
95 (noting that General Assembly resolutions “must be evaluated carefully” before taken as evidence
of formation of customary international law); David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in
International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 256 (2005) (noting that General Assembly resolutions provide evidence
regarding customary international law, but are not dispositive).
137. In Gäfgen v. Germany, 2010 Eur. Ct. H.R. 759, the European Court of Human Rights
declared that Article 3 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, which governs members of the European Union, categorically barred all forms of cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment. Id. ¶ 87. However, litigants conceded that the European
Convention’s categorical bar differed from the more equivocal guidance in the CAT. Id. ¶ 86
(argument of Redress Trust). Moreover, the court declined to hold that the admission of evidence
obtained through threats of harsh treatment rendered the trial unfair. Id. ¶ 187. To reach this result,
the court resorted to one of criminal procedure’s most outcome-determinative doctrines, the
harmless error rule. Id. Overall, the Gäfgen court’s approach was more pragmatic than categorical.
Its implications for the evolution of customary international law on cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment are mixed, at best.
138. One federal decision on interrogation of a criminal defendant within the United States used
the term “torture” to describe a practice much like waterboarding. However, the court analyzed
criminal procedure issues with no relevance to the torture statute. See United States v. Lee, 744 F.2d
1124, 1125 (5th Cir. 1984) (ruling that a sheriff’s deputy who claimed that his superior had ordered
him to participate in violations of defendants’ civil rights was not entitled to a severance at the start
of trial). In the past, the United States had prosecuted both its own troops and Japanese soldiers for
wantonly forcing large quantities of water into subjects’ lungs and stomachs. Cf. Claire Finkelstein
& Michael Lewis, Should Bush Administration Lawyers Be Prosecuted for Authorizing Torture?,
158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 205, 214 (2010); Evan Wallach, Drop by Drop: Forgetting the
History of Water Torture in U.S. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 468, 482–90 (2007). In
contrast, Yoo approved only the ingestion of small amounts of water within specific time limits. See
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel of the
Cent. Intelligence Agency, Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative 4 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/zubaydah.pdf. Yoo was myopic in failing to realize that
interrogators under pressure to get information would force subjects to ingest substantially more
water than he had authorized, and disregard the time limits he had prescribed. See MARGULIES,
supra note 10, at 64–65.
139. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK 3 (2005), http://www.justice.gov/opr/framework.pdf. Norman Spaulding argued
recently that DOJ’s Final Report incorrectly viewed OPR’s guideline as tracking the “clearly
established” law standard for officials’ qualified immunity in tort. Spaulding, Independence and
Experimentalism, supra note 17, at 442; cf. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (stating
the legal standard for qualified immunity). However, since courts have defined clearly established
law as law that is free of material ambiguities, there is little difference between OPR’s requirement
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Scholars can and should criticize Yoo’s myopia. By the same token, the
Obama Administration’s view that waterboarding constitutes torture is a
welcome advance.140 However, neither apt condemnation of Yoo’s advice
nor praise for the current Administration’s stance rebuts the procedural
fairness arguments against formal sanctions.
2.

Disciplining Yoo, Echoes of the Destroyer Deal, and the Danger of
Paralysis

Another difficulty with subjecting Yoo to discipline stems from the
uncomfortable similarity at the level of interpretive method between Yoo’s
work and previous opinions never overruled.141 The aggressive interpretive
method used by Yoo, if not the substance of his work, tracked the approach
of government lawyers from the Republic’s founding. Moreover, it
foreshadows interpretation by Obama Administration lawyers on drone
attacks.142 Disciplining Yoo would chill all such legal work.
Aggressive interpretation started, fittingly enough, with George
Washington. Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation unilaterally restricted
interpretation of a treaty with France to avoid America’s entanglement in
European wars.143 While Washington’s move to spare the new republic this
risk was essential to the United States’ development, contemporaneous
critics attacked its legal justification.144 Interpretation along these lines

of an “unambiguous” norm and the qualified immunity standard. To be sure, OPR could change its
standard to make it more demanding. However, fairness would require that such a change be
prospective in operation.
140. See Eric Lichtblau, Nominee Wants Some Detainees Tried in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2009, at A1 (reporting views of then-Attorney General-designate Eric Holder).
141. See generally Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1 (discussing the precedential
status of OLC and Attorney General opinions).
142. See Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the Annual Meeting
of the American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law
(Mar. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Administration and International Law], available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm (defending the Administration’s position);
infra notes 315–29 and accompanying text (arguing that overall context supported legal
authorization for drone attacks). But see Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat
Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–2009 (Notre Dame Law Sch., Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 09-43, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1501144 (arguing that drone attacks
coordinated by intelligence agents violate international law); Report of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24
(May 20, 2010) [hereinafter Extrajudicial Summary], available at http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/ 135/03/PDF/G1013503.pdf?OpenElement (same).
143. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 338 (1993).
144. See id. at 337–40; Flaherty, supra note 76, at 21, 29–39; cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S.
Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004) (arguing
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continued with Andrew Jackson’s successful campaign to abolish the Bank
of the United States; Jackson’s lawyers interpreted presidential power in a
sweeping fashion to rid the country of what Jackson perceived as a
regressive tool of oligarchical wealth and privilege.145 Lincoln opted for a
robust interpretation of presidential power when he suspended habeas corpus
and issued the Emancipation Proclamation.146 Teddy Roosevelt protected
federal land and used the threat of force abroad to accomplish foreign policy
goals,147 while his cousin Franklin Roosevelt dispatched his cohort of
brilliant legal minds to defend the New Deal against precedents that cast
doubt on its constitutionality.148 Closer to the present day, John F. Kennedy
interpreted the United Nations Charter aggressively to justify the tailored
response of a naval blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis,149 and
President Clinton was even more aggressive in intervening to stop genocide
in Kosovo.150
In the extensive annals of aggressive interpretation, one episode
warrants special mention: Robert Jackson’s authorization of the destroyer
deal with Britain during World War II. In authorizing the destroyer deal,
Jackson relied on the avoidance canon, citing the constitutional basis of
presidential power in narrowly construing the Neutrality Act’s bar on

that the Neutrality Proclamation and other measures taken in the Founding Era did not reflect a
plenary view of executive power).
145. See Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism, supra note 17, at 420–22 (suggesting
that moves demanded by Jackson and implemented by his Attorney General, Roger Taney, of Dred
Scott fame, such as unilaterally transferring federal deposits to state banks from the Bank of the
United States, constituted aggrandizement of power that the Constitution assigned to Congress).
146. See FARBER, supra note 85, at 156–57.
147. See DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS WARRIOR: THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE
CRUSADE FOR AMERICA 14–20 (2009) (describing how Roosevelt declared wildlife reservations and
refuges on federal property, asking only whether Congress had prohibited such action); EDMUND
MORRIS, THEODORE REX 459–61 (2001) (discussing intervention in Cuba in 1906); ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 89 (2004) (discussing Roosevelt’s management of
foreign affairs issues such as the agreement to acquire the Panama Canal). Tempering these
unilateral proclivities, Roosevelt coupled his “stewardship theory” of the Presidency with outreach
to hitherto excluded constituencies, such as labor. See Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative
Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122
HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2084 (2009).
148. See Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism, supra note 17, at 423–29.
149. Louis Henkin, Comment, in ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL
CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 149, 152–53 (1974) (approving of a blockade as a measured use of
force appropriate to the situation, while acknowledging tensions with limits on self-defense in U.N.
Charter, art. 2(4)).
150. See David R. Andrews, The Clinton Administration—David R. Andrews (1997–2000), in
SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE
DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 113, 125 (Michael P. Scharf & Paul R. Williams eds., 2010) (The
State Department Legal Adviser found that because of a combination of compelling humanitarian
need and questionable legal authority, intervention by NATO forces was “justifiable and legitimate,
but not a precedent.”).
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conveyance of material to other nations.151 Jackson also grafted an
artificially narrow specific intent requirement onto the 1917 Espionage
Act,152 which prohibited the intentional transfer to a belligerent power of
“any vessel built, armed, or equipped as a vessel of war.”153 The most
natural interpretation of the text is that Congress wanted to bar the
intentional transfer of any vessel that matched the description. However,
Jackson parsed the provision differently, to bar only the transfer of vessels
originally “built, armed, or equipped” with the specific intent to effect such a
transfer.154 This strained interpretation allowed Jackson to opine that
allowing Britain post hoc to borrow destroyers initially built for American
use was legal.155 Undergirding the entire opinion was Jackson’s argument
that the President could have proceeded if necessary on his own
constitutional authority.156
Jackson’s opinion sported the same aggressive interpretive style as
Yoo’s work more than sixty years later. Jackson invoked the avoidance
canon in a way that furthered executive designs.157 He defined specific
intent with a parched parsimony that conveniently excluded the President’s
transaction with Britain. To close the deal, he piled on a healthy helping of
inherent executive power.158 To be sure, there were significant differences

151. See Jackson op., supra note 29, at 494–96; cf. JACKSON, supra note 29, at 93–103; William
R. Casto, Attorney General Robert Jackson’s Brief Encounter with the Notion of Preclusive
Presidential Power, 30 PACE L. REV. 364, 368–80 (2010) (analyzing opinion).
152. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18,
22, and 50 U.S.C.).
153. Jackson op., supra note 29, at 494 (emphasis added).
154. Id.
155. See id. Jackson cited a treatise which dealt with acts of a citizen or “subject” of a state, and
did not address actions taken by the government itself, as in the destroyer deal. See id. The
Attorney General acknowledged that his distinction between new and old destroyers was
“hairsplitting.” Id. (citing 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 574–76 (5th ed. 1935)).
156. Id. at 486. Jackson cited the favorite decision of executive power’s champions, United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936). Jackson op., supra note 29, at
486. Quoting Justice Sutherland’s opinion in that case, he described the President as the “sole organ
of the Federal Government in the field of international relations.” Id. (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299
U.S. at 320). Jackson failed to note that John Marshall, the source of the “sole organ” description,
had qualified it in a fashion material to the destroyer deal, by noting that the President’s authority
was paramount only in the absence of congressional action. See Statement of John Marshall, 10
ANNALS OF CONG. 613–14 (1800); cf. STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 66 (4th
ed. 2006) (explaining context for Marshall’s remarks); H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the
President’s Authority Over Foreign Affairs, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1471, 1511–27 (1999) (same).
157. See Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 106.
158. Others share this view of Jackson’s opinion as markedly aggressive. See DOJ Final Report,
supra note 15, at 18–19 (quoting Jack Goldsmith, a Harvard law professor who as head of OLC in
2003–2004 withdrew a number of Yoo’s memos, as calling Jackson’s analysis “extremely weak
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in the process leading up to and following Jackson’s opinion, which was
public and ratified by Congress in the Lend Lease Act.159 However, these
differences coexisted with a common strand of aggressive interpretation.
Given the unpredictability of events, the United States might need someone
to advise a future President as Jackson advised Roosevelt.160 Criticizing
Yoo does not imperil this prospect;161 but sanctioning Yoo could
compromise a lawyer’s willingness to assume Jackson’s role.
B. Damage Actions and Hindsight Bias
Concerns about procedural justice and paralysis would also doom a
Bivens lawsuit for damages162 as a method of accountability. Plaintiffs face
multiple obstacles in such lawsuits, including persuading the courts to
recognize such a remedy absent congressional authorization,163 and dealing
with official immunities that thwart relief.164 Each problem is formidable for
plaintiffs hoping to prevail in a lawsuit against OLC lawyers.

[and] unconvincing,” “very bad,” and downright “terrible”). However, Goldsmith’s remarks, cast
with a tinge of irony to juxtapose Jackson’s interpretive method with Yoo’s, dovetailed with a high
regard for Jackson’s place in the national security canon. See id. at 19 (“Any standard that would
have landed Robert Jackson in trouble cannot be the right standard.”).
159. See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A
Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941, 1047 (2008).
160. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 147, at 108 (describing the destroyer deal as “compelled by a
threat to the nation surpassed only by the emergency which led Lincoln to take his actions after
Sumter”).
161. A consensus of elite opinion is a significant sanction for a professional like Yoo, who has
become a negative example. Cf. Vladeck, supra note 14, at 201–06 (discussing informal sanctions
provided by public and elite opinion).
162. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
163. Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (precluding a lawsuit against senior officials by
aliens detained and deported after the September 11 attacks); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 580
(2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (precluding a lawsuit by an alleged survivor of extraordinary rendition);
Brown, supra note 14, at 234–37 (discussing tort suits against officials as legitimate vehicles for
accountability, but cautioning about negative externalities of such litigation); Peter Margulies,
Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96
IOWA L. REV. 195 (2010) [hereinafter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight] (arguing that courts
should avoid categorical preclusion or intervention, and instead consider whether damages actions
would further development of effective alternatives to overreaching); Alexander A. Reinert,
Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model,
62 STAN. L. REV. 809 (2010) (arguing that damages litigation is an important safeguard for
accountability).
164. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (holding that official immunity
protected a former Attorney General sued by an individual who had been detained as a material
witness in a terrorism case); Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (stating the legal
standard for qualified immunity); cf. Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117
(2009) (arguing that the current structure of adjudication for constitutional torts encourages undue
deference to official decisions); Stephen I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for
Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595, 608–12 (2009) (same).
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In some cases involving national security, courts have declined to permit
suits for damages, citing the chilling effect on officials and the risk of
disclosing sensitive information as “factors counseling hesitation.”165 While
there are strong arguments that precluding a lawsuit at this stage bends the
law too far in the direction of impunity, courts in national security cases
have often discounted this countervailing factor.166
In addition, official immunity interposes a significant obstacle to
recovery. Officials have qualified immunity, which courts can breach only
if an official acts in disregard of clearly settled law.167 Official immunities
protect public servants from the unfairness of being surprised by legal
developments that the officials could not have predicted.168 Viewed from an
ex ante perspective, immunities allow officials to make difficult decisions
without paralyzing worries about the effects of hindsight bias.169
The lawsuit by former detainee Jose Padilla170 against Yoo is vulnerable
on each of these counts. While categorical preclusion of Bivens suits can
send an unhealthy signal to officials and encourage official overreaching, an
appeals court might view the need for secrecy in the provision of legal
advice as justifying such a step.171 In any case, the Padilla suit will also
flounder on the grounds of official immunity. A district court found that the
suit could go forward.172 However, the decision failed to adequately explain
how Padilla overcame Yoo’s qualified immunity, in light of the court’s
acknowledgement that “the legal framework relating to [Padilla’s
detention] . . . was developing at the time of the conduct alleged in the

165. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 573, 576–77 (asserting that risk of disclosure of sensitive national
security information was a factor weighing against the availability of a damages claim).
166. Compare id. at 636 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the majority’s
conclusion would make Bivens actions inappropriate in every case), with id. at 576–77 (majority
opinion) (discussing risk of disclosure of sensitive national security information without
acknowledging the dissent’s concerns).
167. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
168. See id. at 245.
169. On hindsight bias, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in
Hindsight, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 95, 95 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000) (noting that
maxims such as “hindsight . . . is ‘20/20’” stand for the proposition that “[l]learning how the story
ends . . . [distorts] our perception of what could have been predicted”).
170. Padilla was subsequently convicted on terrorism charges; his case is on appeal. See Abby
Goodnough & Scott Shane, Padilla is Guilty on All Charges in Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17,
2007, at A1.
171. See Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 790–807 (D.S.C. 2011) (dismissing the
lawsuit brought by Padilla and his mother against the former Secretary of Defense regarding the
same treatment that forms the basis for the lawsuit against Yoo).
172. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1039–40 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
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complaint.”173 The combination of questions about the availability of a
cause of action and the scope of immunity dims the prospects for a lawsuit
against Yoo.174
IV. STRUCTURAL REMEDIES: A CURE WORSE THAN THE DISEASE?
Those impatient with a quixotic reliance on formal sanctions have
proposed structural changes that would make OLC more independent and
judicial in character.175 The most sweeping change comes from Bruce
Ackerman, who has proposed a “Supreme Executive Tribunal.”176 Others,
including Neal Katyal, have offered more modest versions of this
adjudicative turn.177 Norman Spaulding has proposed removal restrictions
for supervisors at OLC, with the goal of making OLC more independent.178
Unfortunately, these proposals will only expand the risks of reform. In
addition, some of the structural proposals undermine the separation of
powers.
A. Courting Disaster: Transforming OLC into a Judicial Entity
Ackerman’s makeover of American government would create a new
tribunal with nine members sitting for staggered twelve-year terms.179 In
advancing his proposal, however, Ackerman failed to specify the role of
standing and other threshold issues.180 This lack of specificity creates more
questions than answers about the tribunal’s role.
The confusion may have stemmed from Ackerman’s unclear depiction
of standing in comparative law. On the one hand, Ackerman acknowledged
that a German tribunal that helped inspire his proposal had a jurisdictional
mandate that would clash with Article III constraints on standing.181 As a
result, Ackerman noted, the German tribunal could not serve as a model for

173. See id. at 1036–37 (emphasis added). For an incisive critique of the failure of the Yoo court
to follow the applicable legal standard or acknowledge the policy rationale for qualified immunity,
see Peter H. Schuck, Immunity, Not Impunity, AM. LAWYER, Nov. 2009, at 51.
174. See Vladeck, supra note 14, at 204–05 (concluding that the lawsuit has a low probability of
success).
175. See Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 17, at 2336–40; cf. Pillard, supra note
4, at 748–58 (discussing other structural reforms in OLC, including a greater role for the Justice
Department’s Office of the Inspector General); Posner & Vermeule, The Credible Executive, supra
note 17, at 896–909 (criticizing Katyal’s proposals as promoting rigidity).
176. See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 143–50.
177. See Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 17.
178. See Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism, supra note 17, at 433–37.
179. See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 143.
180. Id. at 146–47 (noting that the proposal requires “legal fine tuning”); see also id. at 246–47
n.6 (discussing standing).
181. Id. at 246–47 n.6.
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his Supreme Executive Tribunal.182 However, Ackerman also stated that the
French Conseil d’Etat was a more promising template for his approach.183
Yet the Conseil d’Etat issues advisory opinions.184 Borrowing from
institutions elsewhere is often valuable, but one should first be sure what
attributes those institutions possess.
The Tribunal’s interaction with conceptions of standing in the federal
courts is even more unclear. Ackerman would permit suits by members of
Congress, whom the Supreme Court has typically held lack standing to
sue.185 The Tribunal would also hear cases that federal courts would decline
to hear because they raise political questions.186 Courts stay their hand in
these matters to allow Congress and the President to work out their
differences on policy matters.187 Many of these matters may lack clear
standards that facilitate judicial review or may address contexts such as
foreign policy, where the nation should speak with one voice.188 Thus, under
Ackerman’s prescription, a primary source of the Tribunal’s workload
would be decisions about pending statutes or regulations contested by
legislators on policy grounds.
This prescription is worse than the disease.189 Legislators would have
far less reason to negotiate with either the President or their own
colleagues.190 Instead of engaging in the messy business of negotiation, they
would seek the Tribunal’s intervention.191 To perform its advisory function,

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Predictably, the decisions of the Conseil d’Etat clash with the decisions of the other two high
tribunals in France. See David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO.
L.J. 723, 775 n.165 (2009).
185. See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 145; cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 813, 830 (1997)
(holding that members of Congress lacked standing to challenge provisions of a statute authorizing
line-item veto).
186. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 145–46.
187. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
188. See id. at 211–13 (noting that “many such questions uniquely demand a single-voiced
statement of the Government’s views”); cf. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE
CONSTITUTION 45–55 (2001) (discussing institutional concerns such as manageable standards that
influence the role of doctrine in particular cases); Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court?
The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
237 (2002) (recommending greater recourse to doctrine).
189. See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1742–48
(2011) (book review) [hereinafter Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism].
190. See id. at 1744.
191. See id.
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the Tribunal would have to stay pending legislation for weeks or months.192
This delay would have a particularly deleterious impact on foreign policy
matters, where a timely move may be necessary to avert irreparable harm or
capitalize on a fleeting opportunity.193 Moreover, such temporal shifts
would inevitably alter the political dynamic, giving opponents of legislation
an advantage. Leverage of this kind might be useful for groups traditionally
disfavored in the political process; however, equal protection and other
doctrines already protect these groups.194 Ackerman designed his proposal
not for remedying discrimination, but for recalibrating an allocation of
powers among the branches that, in his view, had tilted dangerously toward
the Executive.195
While the Executive Branch would be weaker once Ackerman’s
Tribunal opened for business, it is far less clear that Congress as an
institution would be stronger. The most likely winner would be inertia, as
small groups of legislators representing special interests would seek recourse
in the Tribunal to block rules or statutes that benefited the public as a whole.
The Tribunal might also overshoot the mark on presidential power. Instead
of merely curbing overreaching, the Tribunal might provide timid presidents
with political cover for passivity.196
In short order, the Tribunal might find its own institutional capital
running low. For courts, standing doctrine not only observes Article III
limits on judicial power, but also ensures a concreteness that sharpens
issues.197 By relaxing standing requirements and allowing advisory opinions
on pending legislation, the Tribunal might have to rewrite its own decisions

192. See id. Ackerman subsequently asserted that his proposal still “grant[ed] the President the
power to have the last say,” regardless of the Tribunal’s decision. Ackerman, supra note 17, at 39.
However, the passages from The Decline and Fall of the American Republic that Ackerman cited in
his reply to Morrison did not make this clear, but only ventured the prediction that if the President
“is determined to pursue his course, he must defy the [T]ribunal.” Id. (citing ACKERMAN, supra note
6, at 150). Describing the President as “defy[ing]” the Tribunal sounds like an extra-legal action, not
an exercise of lawful prerogative.
193. For example, delay could have complicated the Louisiana Purchase. See Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 638 n.5 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckinridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 407, 411 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1903)) (discussing
the need for decisive action).
194. See Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (invalidating a provision that
excluded “hippie communes” from the Food Stamp program); cf. FALLON, supra note 188, at 87–89
(discussing rationale for judicial review).
195. ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 143 (noting that the point is to “create a new institutional
mechanism that will put a brake on the presidential dynamic before it can gather steam”).
196. This is also a risk of the present system. See Power of the President in Executing the Laws,
9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 523 (1860) (opinion by President Buchanan’s Attorney General, J.S. Black,
finding that the President lacked power to prevent secession).
197. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (applying the standing doctrine); cf. Matthew I.
Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 562 (2009) (discussing
interplay of constitutional and prudential rationales in threshold doctrines).
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every few weeks as political coalitions shift. As a result, both the legal
community and the public might quickly come to see the Tribunal as a pawn
in the political process, rather than a source of enduring norms. These
consequences of relaxed standing rules also reduce the utility of Neal
Katyal’s earlier, more modest suggestion for an adjudicative turn at OLC.198
An adjudicative model like Katyal’s could also increase polarization.
Katyal proposed sending some interagency disputes to a Director of
Adjudication, whose mandate might also include assessing the effect of
international law on presidential power.199 However, hitching the President
to the wagon of the Director of Adjudication’s advice would have significant
unintended consequences. If the President perceives the Tribunal’s
procedures as too cumbersome to fit the nation’s needs, the legitimacy of the
Tribunal itself may suffer.200 In regulated industries, compliance suffers
when businesses view regulation as out of touch with realities “on the
ground.”201 This sense of illegitimacy of the Tribunal can polarize the
situation, spurring the President to even riskier strategies. Polarization is
even more likely because the President is not locked into advice from a new
tribunal. The President can always secure advice elsewhere, such as from
the White House Counsel.202 This exit strategy would make legal advice
even less independent.203

198. See Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 17; cf. Margulies, True Believers,
supra note 6, at 64 (arguing that “concretely adversarial relationships” sharpen issues and therefore
improve decision makers’ work products).
199. See Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 17, at 2337–40. Katyal highlighted
the possibility that the proposed Director of Adjudication could have issued an opinion on the
applicability of the Geneva Conventions to Guantanamo detainees. Id. at 2340 (noting that an
opinion by a “neutral adjudicator” would have strengthened the case for judicial deference to the
President).
200. OLC has already adopted some procedures that insulate it from political pressure, in the
manner of a court, at the price of “isolating it from its clients and the contexts in which they
operate.” Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1509; see also Pillard, supra note 4, at
734–38 (citing a preference for written requests and an aversion to opining on hypothetical
questions).
201. See, e.g., Neil Gunningham & Darren Sinclair, Regulation and the Role of Trust: Reflections
from the Mining Industry, 36 J.L. & SOC’Y 167, 176–83 (2009) (noting the ineffectiveness of legal
sanctions); Robert A. Kagan, Dorothy Thornton & Neil Gunningham, Explaining Corporate
Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 73–74
(2003) (same); cf. Tom Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence
Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365
(2010) (discussing the positive effects of perception of legitimacy on cooperation with law
enforcement).
202. See Pillard, supra note 4, at 713. But see Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note
189 (arguing that White House Counsel also has a tradition of integrity which will minimize abuses).
Katyal acknowledged this risk. See Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 17, at 2339
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These concerns dovetail with even more pressing constitutional cavils
about restrictions on removal of the Tribunal’s members.204 To ensure the
advice giver’s independence, Ackerman and others have proposed
restrictions on the President’s removal power.205 The Supreme Court has
recently indicated that the separation of powers places limits on Congress’s
ability to create positions within the Executive Branch, whose occupants the
President cannot remove.206 Removal restrictions, including requiring good
cause, are clearly permissible only when the official has responsibility for

(“The traditional case against OLC independence is that it leads to less advice rather than more.”).
To deal with this issue, Katyal proposed allowing agencies and whistleblowers to file cases with the
new adjudicative entity. Id. This proliferation of intra-branch litigants might well promote greater
reflection about governance issues. However, it could also produce an intra-branch version of
Ackerman’s tribunal, in which contending players will too readily seek relief in adjudication instead
of ironing out their differences through negotiation. Katyal’s inter-agency tribunal could also
become a pawn in turf disputes, revising its decisions as agency parties negotiate. Of course, parties
negotiate conventional court cases all the time. However, courts have threshold tests like standing
rules, ripeness, and exhaustion to ensure that parties do not prematurely exit other avenues for
resolving their disputes. See, e.g., Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1.
203. The unique prestige of OLC reduces this cost. See MaryAnne Borrelli et al., The White
House 2001 Project: The White House Interview Program, Report No. 29, at 12 (Nov. 1, 2000),
http://whitehousetransitionproject.org/files/counsel/Counsel-OD.PDF (oral history project on White
House Counsel’s office quoting C. Boyden Gray, White House Counsel under the first President
Bush, as commenting, “[w]e [the White House] were free to ignore their advice but you knew so you
did so at your peril because if you got into trouble you wouldn’t have them there backing you up,
you wouldn’t have the institution backing you up”).
204. In France, members of the political branches, including the Prime Minister and Minister of
Justice, participate in the Conseil d’Etat. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Providing Judicial Review for
Decisions by Political Trustees, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 44 (2005). However, scholars
accept that American elected officials or cabinet members could not serve in this capacity, at least if
the tribunal had any distinctive adjudicative function. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (forbidding
members of Congress from holding executive office); see also Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David
Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113, 119 n.38 (1995)
(noting that the Constitution does not expressly forbid an executive official from holding judicial
office, but that thinkers from Madison forward have believed that a prohibition is implied). The
President could, of course, participate in a more informal intra-branch review of executive policies.
However, that more informal process would lack the independence that Ackerman considered to be
vital.
205. See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 147–49; cf. Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism,
supra note 17, at 433–37. But see Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers, supra note 17, at 2237–38
(conceding that the Constitution could require allowing the President to overrule the Director of
Adjudication).
206. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151–52
(2010) (invalidating removal restrictions on members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) within the Securities and Exchange Commission). However, the Free Enterprise
Fund holding is relatively narrow, and does not alter the pragmatic view of Congress’s power as
outlined in the case law. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671 (1988) (upholding an
independent counsel statute which granted courts the authority to appoint counsel and limited the
President’s removal power); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935)
(upholding a statute requiring good cause for removal of the Chair of the Federal Trade
Commission). For a more expansive view of presidential power, see Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin
H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1153 (1992).

838

DO NOT DELETE

[Vol. 39: 809, 2012]

4/20/2012 1:25 PM

Reforming Lawyers into Irrelevance
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

overseeing administrative adjudication authorized by Congress, or has been
appointed for a limited purpose not involving compliance with the
President’s instructions.207 In those situations, restrictions on removal are
necessary to ensure the integrity of the adjudicative process. However, the
adjudication that Congress can protect only entails regulation of private
sector dealings, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
jurisdiction over publicly traded companies.208 No precedent exists for
creation of a tribunal within the executive branch that would exert binding
power over the President’s decisions.209 An Article III court has such
power,210 but Ackerman’s proposal was a response to perceived
inadequacies with federal court review. The unanswered questions about
Ackerman’s proposal have taken us back to where we started.
Similar problems affect Spaulding’s proposal to preserve OLC’s current
structure, but add restrictions on removal.211 This proposal would also give
the President political cover for inertia, and therefore insulate him from
voters who expect the President to deliver what he promised.212 While
Spaulding argued that the secrecy of OLC’s advice on national security
justified this additional freedom from presidential control, courts have
typically viewed secrecy as facilitating the President’s discharge of purely
executive responsibilities.213 Spaulding was surely correct that secrecy can
become a serious problem in OLC’s work.214 However, the fallout from
excessive secrecy will not justify otherwise unconstitutional restrictions on
the removal power.

207. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3152 (noting that the earlier case concerned the Federal
Trade Commission, an independent agency that was “quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial,” rather
than “purely executive” in character (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 627–29)).
208. Congress can also authorize courts to exercise its prerogatives under Article I of the
Constitution. Bankruptcy courts are one example. Commentators have proposed specialized Article
I courts for immigration and Social Security disability benefits. See, e.g., Stephen H. Legomsky,
Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1678–79 (2010) (discussing the virtues
and risks of such a proposal in an immigration context). However, Congress has never created an
Article I court that purported to define the President’s duties, as Ackerman’s Tribunal would do. See
Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 189, at 1745.
209. See Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 189, at 1745.
210. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
211. See Spaulding, Independence and Experimentalism, supra note 17, at 433–37.
212. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926) (finding that the President has the
sole power to remove purely executive officers).
213. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936).
214. BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 18–19.

839

DO NOT DELETE

B.

4/20/2012 1:25 PM

Doubling Down on Bureaucracy: The New Professional Misconduct
Review Unit

The changes described above, particularly Ackerman’s makeover, are
likely to remain bases for discussion, rather than implementation. Whatever
the merits of these proposals, they at least respond to a felt concern about
past abuses. The one structural change actually promulgated by the new
Administration—the creation of the Professional Misconduct Review Unit
(PMRU)—is unlikely to stop abuses in the future.
The PMRU, established by Attorney General Eric Holder, will review
OPR findings that Justice Department lawyers have engaged in
misconduct.215 However, this measure may not promote accountability.
First, it will not review no-cause determinations by OPR, but only instances
where OPR has recommended discipline.216 Second, the new unit will
further delay the review process by requiring more layers of bureaucracy,
thereby frustrating the public interest in timely review and disclosure.217
While the process needs fixing, the PMRU may compound problems, rather
than alleviate them.
V. DECISIONAL REFORMS: SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS AND DELIBERATIVE
PROCESSES
Reformers have also suggested changes in the substantive standard
governing OLC’s work, and the role it performs. The impetus for these
suggestions comes from a general consensus that Yoo wrongly approached
his job as would a private lawyer advocating in court for his client’s
position.218 In the advocacy context, ethics rules promote a robustly
adversarial debate, by prohibiting only knowing misstatements of fact or
law.219 OLC’s work requires more; however, discerning how much more to
require has proven challenging. Some believe that utter objectivity is
essential.220 Other scholars generally accept an objective standard, but

215. See Press Release, Office of Pub. Affairs, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Creates
Professional Misconduct Review Unit, Appoints Kevin Ohlson Chief (Jan. 18, 2011) [hereinafter
Press Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/January/11-ag-060.html. Most
complaints about DOJ lawyers involve criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens,
715 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2–5 (D.D.C. 2009) (discussing allegations of abuses, including failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence, in the prosecution of late Alaska senator Ted Stevens).
216. See generally Press Release, supra note 215.
217. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A
Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16 n.75 (2009).
218. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 149 (quoting another government lawyer as describing
Yoo’s work as reading “like a bad defense counsel’s brief, not an OLC opinion”); LUBAN, supra
note 6, at 198 (describing Yoo’s memos as “aggressive advocacy briefs”).
219. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1)–(2) (2011).
220. See infra notes 223–26 and accompanying text.

840

DO NOT DELETE

[Vol. 39: 809, 2012]

4/20/2012 1:25 PM

Reforming Lawyers into Irrelevance
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

hedge their bets either by allowing more aggressive opinions when the
lawyer discloses opposing arguments or by permitting a more senior official
such as the President to act against the lawyer’s advice.221 Still others
believe that OLC advice does not resemble a private lawyer’s work or a
judicial decision—instead, “[i]t is something inevitably, and uncomfortably,
in between,” with some, but not unlimited, room for minding the President’s
institutional and policy interests. 222
A. The Perils of Absolutism
Ackerman emphatically belongs in the objectivity camp—he proposed a
Supreme Executive Tribunal to replace OLC because he believed that
anything less than judicial objectivity was a danger to the country.223
Another commentator adopted the same view by declaring that OLC should
provide advice that “fairly addresses and objectively evaluates” the law.224
Proponents of an objective standard acknowledge that law sometimes can be
ambiguous.225 However, according to this view, the OLC lawyer should not
consider the President’s political or institutional interest in assessing what
the law allows.226
The absolutist view is compelling, until it confronts the situation on the
ground. Consider the exigent circumstances that persuaded Robert Jackson
to authorize World War II’s destroyer deal with Britain.227 An absolutist
could question the need for the transaction, though historians have largely
resolved that issue, finding that our refusal would have facilitated
Germany’s defeat of Britain and permitted the Axis powers to pivot toward
attacking the United States.228 A more committed absolutist could reason
that the peril to the country should not figure in her calculations, either
because such danger cannot outweigh contravention of positive law in any
case or because exceptions will eventually cause greater harm to the legal
221. See infra notes 235–37 and accompanying text.
222. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 35.
223. See ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 143–50 (proposing Tribunal); id. at 104 (denouncing
anything less than this standard as “twists and turns of legalese”).
224. See John C. Dehn, Institutional Advocacy, Constitutional Obligations, and Professional
Responsibilities: Arguments for Government Lawyering Without Glasses, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
SIDEBAR 73, 79 (2010).
225. Id. at 78.
226. Id. (stating that OLC lawyers should not shade advice to defend an “‘institutional tradition,’
prerogative, or policy decision”).
227. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 147, at 105–06 (noting that the United States faced a “genuine
national emergency”).
228. See id. at 108.
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fabric. Here, too, however, the historians would whittle down absolutist
arguments, suggesting that only the Civil War surpassed the seriousness of
the situation facing Jackson and his principal, Franklin Roosevelt.229 In
other words, the historians tell us, without the action proposed there might
be no rule of law left to praise.230 After the historians are done, the
absolutist can only insist that even a clear and present danger to the nation
will not justify a relaxed view of the lawyer’s role. That stance merits a
certain grudging admiration, but cannot bind a leader whose first duty is to
the country’s survival.231
Because the absolutist approach is ultimately unpalatable, some
commentators have sought to couple an objective standard with a hedge that
mitigates the standard’s rigidity. Professors Blum and Heymann, for
example, argued that OLC should only provide “mainstream,” not merely
“remotely plausible” or “idiosyncratic” views of the law.232 However, they
suggested that OLC’s limited role should not bind the President, who can act
to safeguard the country.233 While this position offers more flexibility, it
ignores the link between the lawyer’s opinion and the President’s ability to
act. On the destroyer deal, for example, Roosevelt was unwilling to move
without some guarantee of congressional acquiescence, and a major
legislative ally had said that legal justification was necessary.234 While that
may not always be the case, a commentator supporting this hedge should at

229. Id.
230. This was Lincoln’s argument to Congress about the need to suspend habeas corpus in
Maryland. See Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (asserting that
preserving habeas would have allowed “all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted . . . [and] go to
pieces”); cf. SCHLESINGER, supra note 147, at 59 (discussing Lincoln’s exercise of power); Barron &
Lederman, supra note 159, at 998–1000 (arguing that Lincoln’s actions were provisional in nature,
and did not rely on a plenary view of presidential power).
231. See BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 10; see also Michael Walzer, Political Action: The
Problem of Dirty Hands, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 61, 63–67 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004)
(discussing Machiavelli and Weber); Wendel, supra note 5, at 86–87 (discussing Walzer’s view of
leaders as “reluctant realists”); cf. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77, 127 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946) (discussing
leaders’ ultimate responsibilities). But see Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency:
States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004) (arguing that
emergency measures create their own momentum). See generally Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S.
1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Constitution is not a “suicide pact”).
232. See BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 54–55.
233. Id. at 55; cf. id. at 10 (noting this standard).
234. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 147, at 106–07. Admittedly, this is not always the case.
Jefferson completed the Louisiana Purchase despite his Attorney General’s opposition. See John O.
McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney General: A Normative, Descriptive, and
Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 375, 414–17 (1993); cf. Blum, supra note 21, at 281
(arguing that the Executive must assume responsibility for doing what is right even if his lawyers
disagree). See generally Gross, supra note 21, at 1106–07.

842

DO NOT DELETE

[Vol. 39: 809, 2012]

4/20/2012 1:25 PM

Reforming Lawyers into Irrelevance
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

least consider the endogeneity of the lawyer’s opinion to the President’s
decision.
Other scholars hedge by coupling an objective standard with a
dispensation for lawyers who disclose opposing arguments.235 However, this
approach either constrains too little or simply reverts back to the absolutist
standard. It constrains too little because surely some opinions are
unjustifiable, even if the lawyer diligently lists opposing arguments.
Consider an opinion endorsing genocide. Presumably, even a champion of
the opposing argument hedge would view such an opinion as unacceptable
no matter how comprehensively the genocide lawyer recited arguments in
opposition. In fact, proponents of this hedge might be tempted to deny that
the genocide lawyer even made opposing arguments, or find the lawyer’s
canvassing of genocide critiques inadequate. Yoo, as we have seen,
provided caveats for his arguments about specific intent and severe pain.236
Neither caveat saved Yoo’s opinion from myopia, but a scholar whose
approval hinges on opposing arguments should at least mention them.237 A
scholar who fails to do so has reverted back to the absolutist posture, with all
of the problems linked to that stance.
Other scholars—those with experience at OLC—give an answer that
Ackerman deplored but which is still the best start for an honest look at the
“uncomfortably . . . in between” role of OLC.238 For Morrison, OLC should
give “its” best view, which inevitably will consider the President’s
interests.239 This view is the most honest, and also the one that best matches
the long history of OLC and Attorney General opinions.240

235. See LUBAN, supra note 6, at 198; Johnsen, supra note 4, at 1605; Wendel, supra note 5, at
120.
236. See Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 175.
237. Wendel and Luban, who highlighted the importance of opposing arguments, did not mention
Yoo’s caveats. See LUBAN, supra note 6; Wendel, supra note 5; cf. David Luban, Liberalism,
Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1452–57 (2005) (omitting mention of Yoo’s
disclaimers in a lengthy discussion).
238. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 35.
239. See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1502 (stating that OLC should offer
“its best view of the law, which is different from the job of an advocate but also need not carry the
pretense of ‘true’ neutrality”); cf. Johnsen, supra note 4. But see ACKERMAN, supra note 6, at 104
(critiquing OLC veterans’ views as apologia for executive power).
240. See Moss, supra note 4. It may benefit from more specific content, which I offer later in this
Article. See infra Part VI.
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B. Deliberative Virtues: Of Stare Decisis, Disclosure, and Dissenting
Views
Scholars who have turned their attention to a substantive standard have
also considered OLC’s deliberative process. After all, how one makes a
decision is often as important as the underlying substantive standard.
Political theorists have long asserted that deliberative habits are crucial to a
polity’s political development.241 In the OLC context, efforts along these
lines have focused on three areas: disclosure, the presence of dissenting
views, and stare decisis.
1. Disclosure
Disclosure is an important deliberative safeguard. From an ex ante
perspective, disclosure protects against fringe views, since the author of an
opinion knows that outside audiences will “kick the tires” and quickly
discover and critique views that distort the relevant law.242 Disclosure also
helps ex post, by allowing Congress, professional peers, and the public to see
distortions as they emerge and campaign to correct them.243 Disclosure also
works hand in hand with efforts by the President to secure ratification of an
unorthodox view that responds to exigent circumstances; disclosure, at least
to Congress, is a necessary incident of ratification.244 Certain opinions may
contain sensitive information that makes immediate disclosure
inappropriate.245 However, Congress could well require as part of its
oversight that OLC engage in a deliberative process, including making
express findings that become part of an opinion, when such circumstances
prevail.

241. See Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
242. See Margulies, True Believers, supra note 6, at 79–80; Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC,
supra note 1, at 1518–20; Setty, supra note 22 (discussing the importance of the disclosure of legal
policy positions). See generally David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2010)
(discussing the uses and dangers of government secrecy).
243. See Setty, supra note 22, at 602–05 (discussing the benefits of disclosure to generate
political and public sentiments).
244. See Margulies, True Believers, supra note 6, at 66–68 (noting the need for transparency,
even in exigent circumstances, to facilitate dialogue between the branches of government).
245. See Setty, supra note 22, at 610 (discussing the treatment of sensitive information in
balancing the President’s need to act quickly and Congress’s need for information).
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2. Considering Opposing Views
Scholars and veterans of OLC also argue that the office should expressly
consider opposing views.246 Testing views against opposing arguments is a
time-honored approach to deliberation, although it should not shield lawyers
who advise a course that violates clearly established law.247 Seeking input
from government lawyers with opposing views is also a sound practice.248
Without that input, the government can make colossal blunders, as recent
Administrations have shown.249 Moreover, consideration of opposing views
should entail a reasoned statement of those views, including an explanation
of their foundation.250 Yoo’s warning that a jury would consider specific
intent in light of reasonable inferences about the effect of interrogation
practices was a significant step in the right direction, albeit not a complete
response.251 In contrast, his more fleeting caveat about the limited relevance
of Medicaid statutes to the concept of pain in the torture statute only
gestured at the level of deliberation expected.252
3. Stare Decisis
Scholars with experience at OLC have also commended the office’s
respect for precedent as an aid to deliberation.253 Respect for precedent
encourages deliberation, since in the process of discovering and
distinguishing precedent the lawyer will be obliged to grapple with different
views and explore similarities and differences with her own. At its best,
such an approach could also lead to the kind of habits of reflection that
courts at their best display—an effort to find workable approaches that will
stand the test of time. However, developing a workable approach to
precedent at OLC also requires acknowledging the complexities of the task.
Difficult issues include flaws in the analogy between OLC and courts, and

246. See LUBAN, supra note 6, at 198; Johnsen, supra note 4, at 1605; Wendel, supra note 5, at
85.
247. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2011) (noting that it is unethical for a
lawyer to knowingly advise a client to violate the law).
248. See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1522; Spaulding, Independence and
Experimentalism, supra note 17, at 438–39.
249. See Sofaer, supra note 92, at 81–82.
250. See LUBAN, supra note 6, at 198.
251. See Bybee Memo, supra note 7, at 174–75.
252. See id. at 176–77.
253. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 145–46; Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at
1492–1504. See generally Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987) (discussing
meanings and usage).
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uncertainty about the nature of precedent, its effects, and criteria for
overruling prior decisions.
As the critique of Ackerman’s Supreme Executive Tribunal proposal in
the previous Part showed, OLC as currently constituted bears only limited
resemblance to courts.254 Stare decisis works because courts handle scores
or hundreds of cases with similar facts.255 However, OLC does not resolve a
comparable volume of disputes. Compared to most courts, OLC considers
more one-off questions that have high stakes, but little prospect for
recurrence in exactly the same form.256 In this sparser decisional
environment, stare decisis is not as useful.257 As a case in point, consider
Bybee’s analysis of the torture statute.258 Apparently, OLC had never done
such an analysis before, so concrete OLC precedent was unavailable.259
The common law roots of stare decisis may also be an inapposite model
in other respects. Common law decision making has limitations.260 Stare

254. See supra Part IV.A.
255. See Lauren Vicki Stark, The Unworkable Unworkability Test, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1665, 1668
(2005) (noting the need for precedents to reduce the workload of judges).
256. See Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., to Att’ys of the Office
of Legal Counsel, Re: Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 1 (July 16, 2010)
[hereinafter Barron Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olc-legal-adviceopinions.pdf (noting that OLC is “frequently asked to opine on issues of first impression”). As one
ascends the appellate ladder, courts entertain a higher ratio of cases of first impression. The
Supreme Court obviously hears a large percentage of such cases. In cases in which precedent exists,
however, the Court generally accords it significant weight. Instances of overruling often provoke
sharp disagreement among the Justices regarding the existence of narrower grounds for the decision.
Compare Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 917–25 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring)
(arguing that comprehensive overruling of precedent was necessary in a campaign finance case),
with id. at 929–79 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority, which struck down federal
campaign finance provisions, should have decided the case on narrower grounds or respected
precedent by upholding the statute).
257. Morrison’s discussion of his data set of OLC opinions noted that the vast majority are
“neutral,” which he defined as either not mentioning OLC precedent or citing all such precedent
favorably. See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1480–81 (noting that the “neutral”
category included 88.16% of OLC opinions). Morrison did not break down this “neutral” category
into opinions that did and did not cite precedent. He also did not attempt the admittedly difficult
task of quantifying the level of generality of the OLC opinions cited, to discern if some of those
cited were essentially boilerplate, like many cites to Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803), in judicial opinions. Without these more laborious and fine-grained calculations, it is
difficult to assess exactly how precedent shapes OLC’s overall work product. Of course, some
issues do recur. See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1472–73 (noting that
nineteenth century Attorneys General had followed precedent that Spanish claimants seeking
damages from government arising out of conflict in Florida were not entitled to interest). But see id.
at 1474 n.106 (noting that, in 1862, Lincoln’s Attorney General, Edward Bates, declined to follow an
earlier opinion concluding that free blacks were not citizens and therefore were not eligible for
command of American seafaring vessels).
258. See Bybee Memo, supra note 7.
259. See generally id. at 200 (noting that “[t]he situation in which these issues arise is
unprecedented”).
260. ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON 108–09 (2009) (noting that common
law systems can be “inefficient” when “the rate of environmental change is high”).
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decisis is path dependent, so that a precedent established at one point in time
will govern others to follow.261 However, that puts a special onus on the
variables, many of them randomly generated, contributing to the initial
decision.262 While the decision maker at this juncture seeks to anticipate
future implications of her ruling, her clairvoyance will of necessity be
incomplete.263
As a result, the degree of actual constraint imposed by precedent on a
current president becomes a hit-or-miss affair. OLC precedent will constrain
a president who might wish to defy a statute he regards as
This position, which seems unexceptionable in
unconstitutional.264
principle, may raise problems for future presidents regarding statutes that no
longer fit evolving conceptions of human and civil rights.265 Consider, for
example, the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy that for a number of
years limited the eligibility of openly gay individuals to serve in the
military.266 President Obama was right both to seek DADT’s repeal and to
modify enforcement of the provision in the run up to the repeal effort.267
However, OLC’s precedent on compliance with unconstitutional statutes
may have deterred a president of less fortitude and ingenuity from limiting
enforcement of the provision.
In other situations, available precedent from OLC on perennial issues
like presidential power may not adequately constrain the President. Judicial
precedent, such as Youngstown,268 gives the President ample wiggle room—
for example, by leaving up in the air whether the President can act when

261. Id. (discussing path dependence in common law).
262. Cf. id.; Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal
Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 606–22 (2001) (also discussing path
dependence in common law).
263. See Hathaway, supra note 262, at 629 (addressing the limitations of judges considering
future cases).
264. See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. O.L.C.
199 (1994), reprinted in H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL 577, 578 (1999) (arguing that the President has the obligation to execute statutes that the
Supreme Court is likely to uphold).
265. See Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a President to Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake
of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395, 410–19 (2008) (addressing the President’s
“nonenforcement” authority).
266. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993) (repealed 2010).
267. See Craig Whitlock, Pentagon Prepares to Relax ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ WASH. POST, Mar.
25, 2010, at A4 (discussing possible changes to enforcement, including refusal to act on anonymous
complaints).
268. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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Congress is silent.269 The lines between statutory expression, implication,
and silence are notoriously blurred.270 This uncertain boundary leaves OLC
plenty of room to massage a particular situation into one that justifies the
exercise of presidential discretion.
Further complications ensue because the unpredictability of situations
facing the executive and the constitutional status of presidential authority
require some means of overruling OLC precedent. The criteria and
occasions for overruling call for great care, however, if OLC is to avoid the
perception of strategic behavior.271 As Morrison recently acknowledged, a
provision for overruling based on the constitutional views of the President is
required as a legal matter; as a unit within a cabinet department, OLC could
not bind itself to a decisional rule in defiance of the President’s
instructions.272 Moreover, the exception is required for reasons of policy:
exigent circumstances may arise that make rigid adherence to decisional
rules inadvisable.273 However, exceptions complicate the analysis in two
ways. First, if exceptions are possible, stare decisis becomes less effective
as a guide to future advice.274 Lawyers providing advice know ex ante, as do
their clients within the executive branch, that if stare decisis becomes too
confining, the President can alter the advice’s outcome.275 That encourages
both lawyers and their clients below the chief executive level to push the
envelope of precedent to avoid presidential overruling.276 Sometimes the
lawyers may push too far.277 Of course, courts do this too. However, courts
are virtually always public; they must submit their decisions for scrutiny by
the public, the media, and professional elites, who will point out particularly

269. See Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT.
87, 147–49 (2002) (arguing that avoiding precise delineation of the President’s inherent power is
unhealthy for democratic deliberation); Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy of Youngstown,
83 S. CAL. L. REV. 263 (2010) (discussing uncertainty in the Steel Seizure test).
270. See Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency, Institutional
Equity, and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383 (2004).
271. See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1504–18 (citing Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (noting the factors for overruling, including
workability, hardship, and obsolescence)).
272. However, as Morrison notes, OLC cannot simply surrender its duty to provide legal advice.
See id. at 1512 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 511–512 (2006), statutory authority for the Attorney General’s
provision of advice to the President).
273. See supra Part V.A.
274. See Stark, supra note 255, at 1674 (noting that, in the judicial context, overruling precedent
undermines the legitimacy of the Court).
275. See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1517–18.
276. See id.
277. See id. at 1517. This dynamic may be less salient because the President may view
overruling as a serious step that signals legal jeopardy. See Borrelli et al., supra note 203; Morrison,
Constitutional Alarmism, supra note 189.
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strained arguments.278 That acts as accountability of a sort. In contrast,
while disclosure is a valued incident to OLC advice, the President can
choose not to disclose.279 So OLC as a practical matter has fewer constraints
in the way that it interprets the bond imposed by stare decisis in a particular
case.
Despite these caveats, the regime of stare decisis articulated above also
clarifies a matter that has continued to provoke debate: the status of
decisions by presidents like Jefferson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt to move
beyond the textual limits of their authority.280 Some have argued that these
decisions were extralegal.281 Their legitimacy depended on subsequent
ratification, and they presumably had no precedential value.282 Hamilton, in
contrast, believed that in exigent situations the President had such power
under the Constitution.283 The truth (appropriate enough for OLC) is
somewhere in between. Presidential decisions of this type do depend on
subsequent ratification for their legitimacy; however, ratification does confer
on such decisions a limited precedential value. Willingness to treat such
historical examples as relevant precedent encourages analytical use of these
episodes, rather than slipshod or expedient invocation. To be sure, OLC
lawyers should handle these examples with care, because they emerged from
the cauldron of extraordinary events, and because their citation as precedent
will also signal a comparable testing of the limits of presidential power.284
For the latter reason, presidents will seldom deem it prudent to cite these
examples from history, and that is as it should be.

278. See generally Todd E. Freed, Is Stare Decisis Still the Lighthouse Beacon of Supreme Court
Jurisprudence?: A Critical Analysis, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1767 (1996) (commenting on the Court’s
differing treatment of stare decisis).
279. Few, if any, reformers suggest that all OLC advice should be disclosed immediately upon its
issuance. See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1482–83 (acknowledging the general
importance of confidentiality). But see id. at 1518–19 (arguing that presidential overruling should be
disclosed).
280. See BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 10–11.
281. See id. at 11–12 (summarizing arguments against these decisions).
282. See id. at 11 (discussing debate); Gross, supra note 21.
283. BLUM & HEYMANN, supra note 8, at 11; cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of
Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257 (2004) (arguing for broad executive power).
284. Jackson, for example, cited Jefferson in his destroyer deal opinion. See Jackson op., supra
note 29, at 487–88 (asserting that the transaction with Britain “falls far short in magnitude of the
acquisition by President Jefferson of the Louisiana Territory”). During the Reagan Administration,
then-Assistant Attorney General Ted Olson cited Jackson’s opinion in finding that aid to the
Nicaraguan contras did not violate the Neutrality Act. See Overview of the Neutrality Act, 8 Op.
O.L.C. 209, 216–17 (1984).
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VI. DIALOGIC EQUIPOISE AND OLC
Ultimately, OLC is not so much a quasi-judicial as a constitutionalist
body that imposes constraints on the executive in the shorter term for the
sake of longer term gains. Majorities consent to constitutional protections
because they know that a protection that frustrates them today may
safeguard their rights tomorrow.285 Similarly, presidents value OLC because
it gives them more room to maneuver once its concerns are satisfied, even
though satisfying its concerns can be challenging in the near term. The
sustainability of the institution requires a kind of dialogic equipoise.286
The OLC lawyer must always consider how other stakeholders,
including Congress and the courts, will view executive initiatives. Just as
lawyers often leverage their own reputation to build up goodwill for their
clients,287 the OLC lawyer’s pedigree of deliberation gives her advice special
clout. An OLC lawyer who too readily buys into the President’s initiatives
will cannibalize her own credibility, and eventually leave the President
without the imprimatur that OLC can provide.288 In that way, an ideological
affinity between an OLC lawyer and the President is like the siren song that
distracted Ulysses289 from his journey home: it tempts executive officials
with the promise of short-term benefits while holding long-term perils.290
As the metaphor suggests, accepting OLC’s advice is a Ulysses contract,
which binds the principal to the mast to ensure the journey’s successful
conclusion. On the other hand, if OLC becomes an unduly cumbersome
institution, the costs of seeking its imprimatur outnumber the benefits.291
The virtues of this coordinated game for the President decline. At that point,
the President will deem it most efficient to exit and seek advice from another
quarter, and again OLC will lose its ability to influence policy.292 OLC
should cultivate a sense of balance, avoiding opinions that unduly constrict
or expand executive power.

285. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional
Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1826–28, 1835 (2009) (discussing the premises of
constitutionalism).
286. See Margulies, True Believers, supra note 6, at 66–71.
287. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,
94 YALE L.J. 239, 263–67 (1984).
288. See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1513.
289. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY
(1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129,
1140 (1986).
290. OLC’s memos in the year and a half after September 11 offered policymakers temporary
peace of mind, while undermining their chances for subsequent buy-in from the other branches. See
GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 206–07.
291. See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1, at 1511–18 (highlighting the need for
OLC to balance adherence to its precedent with the President’s authority to abrogate that precedent).
292. See id.

850

DO NOT DELETE

[Vol. 39: 809, 2012]

4/20/2012 1:25 PM

Reforming Lawyers into Irrelevance
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

A. Combining Substance and Deliberation
To pursue this elusive goal, a dialogic equipoise approach articulates a
substantive test for acting in crises, but then uses the deliberative device of a
cap to limit such expansive use of presidential power. In this way, it uses
OLC’s unique standing when circumstances require, but also maintains that
standing through a precommitment mechanism that curbs overreaching.
This hybrid strategy helps keep OLC safe from the polar extremes of undue
risk aversion and risk-prone decisions.293
The substantive test has three requirements. First, action that pushes the
envelope must have a compelling sovereignty- or human rights-centered
rationale, defined respectively as the avoidance of irreparable harm to the
nation or the promotion of emerging norms of liberty or equality. Second,
the action taken must have a reasonable chance of ratification. Third, the
action cannot violate any other constitutional norms.294
Sovereignty-centered actions would include measures, such as the
Louisiana Purchase, which vastly increased the nation’s size and resulted
from fleeting circumstances abroad that made the only alternative—passage
of a constitutional amendment—impracticable.295 This category would also
include Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus in Maryland in April 1861 to
prevent the separation of the nation’s capital from the rest of the Union.296
Roosevelt’s destroyer deal with Britain during World War II297 and
Kennedy’s imposition of a blockade during the Cuban Missile Crisis298 also
meet this high standard. In each case, substantial controversy attended the
decision at the time. However, historians now generally agree that each
measure served the national interest.299
293. See supra Part II.
294. These would include provisions found in the Bill of Rights or the Equal Protection Clause.
The criteria in the text distill presidential decisions, often supported by legal advice, that have
pushed the envelope in a fashion that history has judged kindly. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 147,
at 89, 109.
295. See Gross, supra note 21, at 1106–08.
296. Demonstrating the urgency of the crisis, in April 1861, Confederate sympathizers in
Maryland targeted Union troops and burned railroad bridges from Baltimore to the North. See
JAMES F. SIMON, LINCOLN AND CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY: SLAVERY, SECESSION, AND THE
PRESIDENT’S WAR POWERS 184–85 (2006).
297. See JACKSON, supra note 29, at 93–103.
298. Peter Margulies, When to Push the Envelope: Legal Ethics, the Rule of Law, and National
Security Strategy, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 642, 671 (2007).
299. The largest remaining historical controversy concerns Lincoln’s suspension of habeas
corpus, although even with regard to that episode, historians fault the suspension’s temporal and
geographic expansion, not the relatively tailored measure in Maryland in the spring of 1861. See
MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991).
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Human rights-centered moves would include Lincoln’s Emancipation
Proclamation,300 President Clinton’s participation in NATO’s intervention
to stop genocide in Kosovo,301 and President George H.W. Bush’s
participation in a United Nations humanitarian mission in Somalia.302
Lincoln defended this aspect of presidential action most effectively, viewing
emancipation not merely as a military measure, but also as “an act of
justice” consistent with the “considerate judgment of mankind.”303 The
United States is strongest when it acts decisively to prevent humanitarian
catastrophes because the credibility thus acquired can also bolster diplomatic
efforts in the future.304 Congress’s ratification or acquiescence demonstrates
that the President in such contexts often acts as an agent for both political
branches.
The Obama Administration’s decision to help stop the loss of life in
Libya qualified on both humanitarian grounds and reasons related to the
United States’ role in global institutions.305 Here, the slaughter of innocents
would have been substantial without timely intervention. The Security
Council had authorized the move, and action without the United States
would have undermined America’s commitment to the efficacy of
international organizations.306 The interventions in Somalia and Kosovo
provide precedent, making the decision to intervene consistent with stare
decisis in the Executive Branch.
The Libyan intervention also poses no violation of any other
constitutional norms, which would bar any presidential action that violated
provisions of the Bill of Rights or of the Equal Protection Clause. This

300. See Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation (Jan. 1, 1863), in 6 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 28 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter Emancipation
Proclamation]; cf. Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Was the Emancipation
Proclamation Constitutional? Do We/Should We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
1135, 1142–45 (discussing legal and historical context).
301. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 33, at 548–49.
302. See Authority to Use United States Military Forces in Somalia, 16 Op. O.L.C. 6 (1992);
Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General, 16 Op. O.L.C. 8, 9–12 (1992) [hereinafter Somalia
Memo].
303. See Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 300; cf. ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL:
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN SLAVERY 237 (2010) (quoting Lincoln’s December 1862
message, describing emancipation as the “last best . . . hope of earth”).
304. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S ONLY
SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE 35 (2002) (suggesting that actions reflecting world consensus
will result in “important opportunities for cooperation in the solution of global problems such as
terrorism”); Christopher J. Borgen, Hearts and Minds and Laws: Legal Compliance and Diplomatic
Persuasion, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 774–78 (2009) (noting the significance of global credibility
with both governing elites and citizenry of other nations).
305. See Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 10 (2011); see also Charlie
Savage, Attack Renews Debate Over Congressional Consent, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, at A14
(discussing initial reactions).
306. This was also a rationale for President George H.W. Bush’s decision to intervene in
Somalia. See Somalia Memo, supra note 302, at 11.
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prong would prohibit any unilateral executive effort to detain United States
citizens without judicial review. Because of this restriction, no President
could unilaterally implement a program like the Japanese-American
internment program during World War II.307
The ratification requirement entails a reasonable expectation that
Congress would either specifically endorse the President’s decision through
an affirmative act or acquiesce in the decision, or a reasonable belief that
Congress has already authorized the decision. Both future legislative acts
and acquiescence would require timely public disclosure, of the kind
demonstrated by Lincoln regarding habeas corpus, Roosevelt in the
destroyer deal, and Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis.308 Roosevelt and
Jackson, for example, engaged in a process of “extensive and vigilant
consultation” with internal and external stakeholders. 309 That deft and
patient process eventually led to Congress’s ratification of the destroyer deal
in the Lend-Lease Act.310 The tailored nature of America’s Libya role and
consultation with congressional leaders about the move311 would fulfill this
criterion.

307. See Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933 (2003) (discussing
internment litigation). Congress also could not require broad internment of citizens, given any
sensible reading of the sum total of Supreme Court precedent, which would include Korematsu as a
negative example, much like John Yoo’s lawyering. Cf. Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein,
Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT.
261 (2002) (discussing changes in American constitutional culture since World War II). Lincoln’s
initial suspension of habeas received post hoc approval from the Supreme Court in dicta in Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866) (observing that “in a great crisis . . . exigency . . . [could
permit suspension when] immediate public investigation according to law may not be possible;
and . . . the peril to the country may be too imminent to suffer such persons to go at large”).
308. See supra notes 294–98 and accompanying text.
309. See SCHLESINGER, supra note 147, at 108.
310. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 199–205.
311. See Savage, supra note 305. The legal status of the United States’ role in Libya after
expiration of the War Powers Resolution’s sixty-day deadline for seeking congressional
authorization presents more vexing questions. See Charlie Savage, Libya Effort is Called Violation
of War Act, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2011, at A8. The Administration argued that its role after
expiration of the deadline was largely confined to supplying French and English forces, which it said
did not rise to the level of “hostilities” under the War Powers Resolution. See Trevor W. Morrison,
Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch Legal
Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 62 (2011) [hereinafter Morrison, Libya Hostilities],
available at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/ media/pdf/vol124_forum_morrison.pdf. However,
United States warplanes and drones also attacked Libyan positions during this current phase of the
conflict. Id. Although Congress did not define “hostilities,” the use of lethal force would seem to
qualify. Moreover, the Administration did not push hard for congressional ratification of its
position, although it said it would “welcome” congressional approval. See Donna Cassata, Senate
Panel Votes to Back US Actions in Libya that House Rebuked, BOS. GLOBE (June 29, 2011),
http://articles.boston.com/2011-06-29/news/29718051_1_libya-senate-panel-war-powers-resolution.
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In contrast, the low likelihood of ratification would preclude advice like
John Yoo’s about interrogation tactics.312 Moreover, coercive questioning of
suspected terrorists will rarely avoid irreparable harm, since traditional
methods of interrogation such as building rapport are plausible alternatives
to the tactics that Yoo authorized.313 Even in cases where alternatives have
been unavailing, the government should discount the harm that coercive
questioning could conceivably prevent by the harm that such questioning
inflicts on the integrity and discipline of government institutions.314
B. A Case Study: The Obama Administration and Drone Attacks in
Pakistan
To see dialogic equipoise in action, consider the Obama
Administration’s defense of drone attacks.315 This use of force emerged as a
response to a serious strategic problem. Al Qaeda and Taliban forces can
readily move between Pakistan and Afghanistan, seeking to destabilize both
countries.316 The situation prior to the drone attacks produced an asymmetry
favoring these groups: they had freedom of action, while United States
forces had limited options. Along with this strategic dilemma, the
Administration confronted a legal conundrum. Self-defense was the best
rationale for strikes against the destabilizing al Qaeda and Taliban forces;
but under conventional views, international law requires an imminent threat
providing “no moment for deliberation.”317

In addition, reports indicate that the Administration attached no special weight to OLC’s opposition,
but merely treated OLC’s view as one of a number of competing sources of advice. Morrison, Libya
Hostilities, supra, at 66. In short, the Administration’s position exceeded the bounds of the dialogic
equipoise model.
312. Indeed, the Bush Administration seemed to recognize that congressional approval would not
be forthcoming, since senior officials kept the interrogation program secret, even from other
Administration lawyers. See MARGULIES, supra note 10, at 61.
313. See JANE MAYER, THE DARK SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR
TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 105–06 (2008) (discussing how veteran FBI
interrogators used traditional, lawful interrogation techniques to get information from suspected
terrorist Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi).
314. See WALDRON, supra note 131, at 20, 28–32 (discussing countervailing factors); Daniel
Kanstroom, Law, Torture, and the “Task of the Good Lawyer”—Mukasey Agonistes, 32 B.C. INT’L
& COMP. L. REV. 187, 194–97 (2009) (same). See generally Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical
Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589 (1985) (discussing the importance of lawyers’
consideration of long-term values).
315. See Administration and International Law, supra note 142; cf. Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.
Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (ruling that petitioner, the father of an American citizen in Yemen, who
was allegedly targeted by the United States, lacked standing, and that the matter presented a political
question).
316. See Jane Perlez, Pakistan’s Military Chief Criticizes U.S. Over a Raid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
2008, at A8.
317. This definition comes from Secretary of State Daniel Webster’s response to the Caroline
episode, in which the British attacked a ship near Niagara Falls which had previously conducted
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This conventional view allowed terrorists to game the system. Viewed
ex ante, the imminence test does not deter terrorists, who unlike states have
no “return address.”318 While a state’s fixed location permits retaliation by
victims of aggression, transnational terrorist groups like al Qaeda can melt
away and reconstitute themselves to plan subsequent attacks.319 As al Qaeda
demonstrated when it followed up the Kenya and Tanzania Embassy
bombings with the attack on the USS Cole and September 11, while future
attacks are not necessarily “imminent” in the conventional sense, recent
history leaves little doubt of the group’s capacity and intent. The United
Nations has not codified a substitute to the conventional understanding.320
However, one can read measures enacted by the international community
after September 11 as authorizing a broadened conception of self-defense.321

raids into Canada. See Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secretary of State, to Henry Fox, British
Minister in Washington (Apr. 24, 1841), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/
br-1842d.asp#web1. The United Nations Charter arguably codifies the Caroline standard. See U.N.
Charter art. 51.
318. See William C. Banks & Peter Raven-Hansen, Targeted Killing and Assassination: The U.S.
Legal Framework, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 667, 679–81 (2003) (arguing that the use of force was
appropriate under international law); Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar Al-Awlaki as a
Case Study in the International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L.
3 (2010); James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in
Contemporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-Defense, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 429, 463–69 (2006) (noting the importance of flexibility in the definition of imminence);
Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. Use of
Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 237 (2010) (arguing that the use of force was
appropriate under international law); Oscar Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against
Terrorist Bases, 11 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 309 (1989) (same). In contrast, opponents of the new
Administration’s policy argued for a narrow reading of Webster’s test and rights of self-defense. See
Extrajudicial Summary, supra note 142, ¶ 45 (discussing the Caroline standard); O’Connell, supra
note 142, at 15 (arguing that the use of force to disable terrorist groups planning subsequent attacks
is not truly “defensive” in character, but amounts to “unlawful reprisal”); cf. Richard Murphy &
Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405
(2009) (arguing that due process should govern targeting killing).
319. See Administration and International Law, supra note 142 (noting that a terrorist group such
as al Qaeda “does not have conventional forces, but . . . plans and executes its attacks against us and
our allies while hiding among civilian populations”).
320. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
321. For example, Security Council Resolution 1373 stipulates that member states should
“combat [terrorism] by all means” and “cooperate . . . to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and
take action against perpetrators of such acts.” See S.C. Res. 1373, pmbl., ¶ 3(c), U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). As another example of this changing repertoire, consider the evolving
consensus on Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention, which confers privileged combatant
status on members of groups that commit violence in the course of “fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes.” See Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 1, ¶ 4, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. Before September 11, the United
Nations General Assembly had repeatedly endorsed Protocol I. See Michael A. Newton,
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State Department Legal Adviser Harold Koh, in his defense of drone attacks,
acknowledged limits imposed by the principles of distinction and
proportionality, which require that officials refrain from targeting civilians
and minimize collateral damage.322 Interpreting international law as both
dynamic in the face of new challenges and safeguarding abiding values such
as the protection of civilians, Koh served in the best tradition of national
security lawyering.
The Administration’s drone policy is also a worthy example of dialogic
equipoise because of the steps the Administration took to ensure that the
policy was authorized by Congress and understood by the international law
community. Koh spoke publicly about the rationale for the United States’
approach, allowing those who disagreed to state their reasons.323 The drone
strategy, Koh argued, was permitted under the Authorization for Use of
Military Force (AUMF),324 which was passed shortly after the September 11
attacks and empowered the President to take all necessary and appropriate
steps to prevent future attacks by al Qaeda.325 The Obama Administration
also engaged with international law as an evolving body of jurisprudence.326
This engagement contrasted with the Bush Administration’s dismissal of
treaties like the Geneva Convention as “quaint” and “obsolete.”327
Furthermore, the new Administration consulted a range of intra-branch

Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a World United Against Terrorism, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323,
344–47 (2009) (discussing enactment of Protocol I). After September 11, an international consensus
emerged around denial of immunity from criminal prosecution for terrorist groups, reflecting the
United States’ refusal to ratify Protocol I and the reservations noted by other countries in the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). See id. at 360–70.
322. See also Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, No Secrets in the Sky, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2010, at A23 (citing statistics that drone attacks run by the Central Intelligence Agency in Pakistan
kill five confirmed terrorists for every civilian). Presumably Koh, and not OLC, coordinated the
defense of drone attacks because of the salience of international law questions. Similar legal arguments
support the raid that resulted in the killing of Osama bin Laden. See Jeremy Pelofsky & James Vicini,
Bin Laden Killing was U.S. Self-Defense: U.S., REUTERS (May 4, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2011/05/04/us-binladen-selfdefense-idUSTRE74353420110504 (reporting on the testimony of
Attorney General Holder before the Senate Judiciary Committee); Kenneth Anderson, Time for
Secretary Clinton to Call Her Lawyer?, OPINIO JURIS (May 6, 2011, 6:06 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/
2011/05/06/time-for-secretary-clinton-to-call-her-lawyer/ (summarizing arguments).
323. See generally Administration and International Law, supra note 142.
324. Authorization for Use of Military Force in Response to the 9/11 Attacks, Pub. L. No. 10740, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
325. See Administration and International Law, supra note 142; cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 516–18 (2004) (relying on AUMF); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional
Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005) (discussing impact of
AUMF).
326. See generally Administration and International Law, supra note 142.
327. See Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to President, to the President,
Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al
Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 118–
19 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005).
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experts, including Legal Adviser Koh.328 Indeed, Koh’s distinguished
pedigree as a critic of unilateral executive moves and American rejection of
mainstream international law enhanced the Administration’s credibility.329
C. Capping Expansive Advice on Executive Power
Capping OLC’s expansive presidential power opinions would
complement the substantive standard and provide a further bulwark against
abuse. Abuse occurs in two forms: overt reliance on inherent presidential
power and use of the avoidance doctrine to narrowly construe statutes that
might otherwise trench on the President’s supposed prerogatives.330 A cap,
which OLC could adopt as a best practice,331 would limit the number of
times in a given period that OLC could invoke the inherent power of the
President or invoke the avoidance canon to narrowly construe a statute that
limits executive discretion.
A cap on OLC opinions expanding presidential power would work in
the following way: in each two-year period, OLC could issue three
opinions332 using the substantive test set out above, that either supported
inherent presidential power or interpreted statutes narrowly to avoid
ostensibly unconstitutional constraints on executive power. If OLC failed to
stay within this cap, it could issue more opinions upholding executive
power, but only if those opinions met the absolutists’ test of objective
interpretation. If OLC could not match the executive’s preferred course with
this more rigorous test, it would commit itself to not rendering a favorable
opinion. This would not necessarily preclude the President from going
forward. The President could overrule OLC’s constitutional interpretation333
328. See Morrison, Libya Hostilities, supra note 311.
329. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 96 (1990) (describing Roosevelt’s destroyer deal with Britain as
“notorious”); cf. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 142–44 (2010) (suggesting that presidents gain credibility when they
appoint advisors with contrary views).
330. See Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 106.
331. See Barron Memo, supra note 256. Congress could not impose a cap, although it could
perhaps ask for internal findings subject to follow-up by the House or Senate Intelligence Committee
Chair or ranking member. Cf. Kathleen Clark, Congress’s Right to Counsel in Intelligence
Oversight, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 915 (arguing that the members of Congress on intelligence
committees have a right to advice from staff lawyers, even though legislation limits access to
sensitive information to members themselves).
332. The opinions would have to be on discrete matters to avoid omnibus opinions that would
evade the cap.
333. See Morrison, Stare Decisis in OLC, supra note 1. Sometimes, the President may even be
right. See Robert H. Jackson, A Presidential Legal Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1353 (1953)
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or dismiss OLC’s head and find a more pliable individual for the job.
However, the cap would supply a bump in the road, and signal to observers
both within and outside the Executive Branch that the President was on
shaky ground. Although a President could still embrace the “go it alone”
option by using White House Counsel, OLC’s implicit finding that the
President’s position lacked support would be a marker for other officials and
for the public.
A cap would further dialogic equipoise by forcing the President and
OLC to carefully budget their most sweeping arguments. This would
prompt insight about these arguments’ unintended effects, while still
granting the President flexibility to use OLC in exigent circumstances. A
president like George W. Bush, who uses power in a profligate fashion,
eventually finds himself without credibility with constituencies and
stakeholders that matter, including Congress, the courts, and the legal
community.334 While profligate exercises of power work for a time, they
have serious long-term consequences. They can result over time in a
diminution of presidential authority, as actions spark a counterreaction in a
never-ending cycle. Sweeping exercises of power can also lock in future
presidents to policy initiatives that have outlived their usefulness. For
example, Bush’s sweeping exercises of power in short order produced the
detention facility of Guantanamo Bay, which became a global metaphor for
presidential excess. The symbolism of the facility damaged not only the
President’s credibility, but that of the United States.335 However, the
alarming speed with which Bush Administration officials built the place336
contrasts with the difficulties encountered in closing it. Guantanamo has
been “Humpty-Dumpty in reverse: easy to assemble, but very difficult to
take apart.”337 Caps on invocation of presidential authority by OLC would
limit the damage, while still allowing invocation of authority in cases where
no alternative existed.
Despite the recent outcry over proposed “cap-and-trade” legislation,
caps have worked well in environmental law. With a cap in place, producers
have to deliberate more carefully over their output.338 The cap regime
(discussing President Roosevelt’s position, contrary to Jackson’s own, that the Lend-Lease provision
allowing Congress to suspend aid to Britain through legislative veto was invalid; the Supreme Court
agreed in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
334. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 4, at 206–07.
335. See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, § 2(b) (Jan. 22, 2009), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-13492.pdf.
336. See KAREN GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100 DAYS 45–
47 (2009) (discussing the drafting of legal opinions after September 11 advising that Guantanamo
detentions would not be subject to judicial review).
337. See MARGULIES, supra note 10, at 160.
338. Cf. John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and Demand for
Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 1398–404 (2008) (analyzing market-based strategies);
Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per Capita
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creates an incentive to develop new techniques that have fewer ecological
consequences.339 Moreover, because a cap in environmental law does not
bar older technologies, but merely obliges producers to internalize
ecological costs, it yields greater flexibility than an outright prohibition.340
This incentive for innovation can also harmonize executive practice with
constitutional norms.341
A cap of this kind is also merely a codification of practices that lawyers,
courts, and agencies engage in with some frequency to develop and conserve
institutional capital. Lawyers who are repeat players in litigation or
transactional work often consciously ration their arguments, tailoring their
positions to those that will command respect from other repeat players.342
By cultivating a reputation for reasonableness, lawyers find it easier to
achieve their client’s goals. Lawyers also have the authority to pick and
choose among legal arguments so that they can select arguments that are
most likely to persuade an appellate tribunal or reviewing court, even if
other arguments are colorable and ethically defensible.343 This capacity
allows lawyers to marshal arguments for a client despite the client’s shortterm insistence on making every argument in the book. United States
Attorneys insist on a measure of independence from Washington for related
reasons: a reputation for independence helps cement the prosecutor’s
reputation with federal judges, who could derail prosecutions if they believe
the prosecutor was politically motivated or blindly following directives from
Washington.344 Indeed, in many situations a prudent client will find a
lawyer known for a reasonable approach that meshes with that of other
repeat players—the dominance in white-collar criminal defense of former
Basis?, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 51 (2009) (discussing the mix of ex ante and ex post effects in a capand-trade regime).
339. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 338, at 52 (noting that a cap-and-trade system might be
“the most effective and efficient method of reducing emissions”).
340. See Robert W. Hahn, Climate Policy: Separating Fact from Fantasy, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 557, 590 (2009) (arguing that a cap on emissions would promote innovation).
341. Cf. Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight, supra note 163, at 237–44 (advocating an
“innovation-eliciting” model to determine availability of Bivens actions in national security cases).
342. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and
Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1994); cf. Stephanos Bibas &
William W. Burke-White, International Idealism Meets Domestic-Criminal-Procedure Realism, 59
DUKE L.J. 637, 658–59 (2010) (discussing the screening of arguments that encourages trust between
repeat players in the criminal justice system).
343. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 749–50 (1983).
344. See John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney General
Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV. 1697,
1716–22 (2003) (federal judge discusses how prosecutorial charging decisions signal appreciation of
local conditions, including sentiments of jury pool).
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prosecutors testifies to the importance of signaling that one has a track
record that merits trust.345 These lawyer practices amount to informal
caps—they are not expressly quantitative, as the cap here would be, but they
limit the kinds of arguments that lawyers make.
Courts are also concerned with marshaling institutional capital. As
Bickel observed, doctrines such as standing, mootness, ripeness, and
political questions conserve judicial capital for the most pressing
Brandeis, who was not reticent about intervention,347
occasions.346
nonetheless cautioned that the Court should decide matters on the narrowest
ground available.348 Moreover, courts shape substantive decisions to avoid
unnecessary strife with the political branches. Courts may break new
ground in doctrine, and then trim back remedies.349 In recent national
security cases, for example, courts have granted detainees significant
procedural rights, but declined to extend damages remedies against officials
who have allegedly denied detainees those rights in the past.350 Some
scholars have suggested that this balance has erred on the side of caution,351
but the Supreme Court’s goal has avowedly been to avoid the “pendular
swings” that make government unmanageable.352 A cap would help OLC
maintain this constitutional equilibrium.

345. Cf. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2120–21 (1998) (discussing the dynamics of plea bargaining in the federal system, which
hinges on signals that inspire mutual trust); Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST.
L.J. 69, 89–100 (1995) (discussing the benefit to the defendant of cooperation with government,
aided by a lawyer whose pedigree signals trustworthiness).
346. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues,
75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961); cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Legal Academy
Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 84–94 (2006) (describing how one advocate used Bickel’s
approach to persuade the Supreme Court to reject President Bush’s unilateral establishment of
military commissions as a radical step). But see Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the
“War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1051–53 (2008) (arguing that the incremental
approach emboldened the Executive Branch); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional
Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 1041–43 (2008) (suggesting that Bickel’s approach may be
counterproductive when a showdown now will lower decision costs later).
347. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (setting
out First Amendment concerns with a prohibition of membership in political group).
348. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
349. See Goldsmith & Levinson, supra note 285, at 1810–16 (noting the interaction between
substantive doctrine, remedies, and politics); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 884–85 (1999) (pointing out that over time courts define
rights, such as those to nondiscriminatory public education or freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment, to promote manageable remedial regimes); cf. FALLON, supra note 188, at 49–50
(noting the role of manageability in shaping of doctrine).
350. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
351. See Martinez, supra note 346, at 1054–61.
352. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) (striking down the habeas-stripping
provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006).
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VII. CONCLUSION
OLC built up institutional credibility over time, and lost much of it
within a period of eighteen months after September 11.353 During that
period, neither OLC nor its government clients paid sufficient attention to
OLC’s long-term institutional role.354 Since that point, commentators have
been eager to fill the gap.355
Reform, however, is an elusive goal for an institution like OLC, whose
mission resists pigeonholes and job descriptions. Moreover, reformers have
to consider a range of sometimes competing concerns.356 Most observers
agree that a climate of categorical impunity would trigger a recurrence of the
problems that led to this pass.357 But that still leaves a wide range of
options.
In curbing impunity, reformers also have to consider the countervailing
risks of procedural injustice, paralysis, and polarization.358 A failure to
consider each risk will derail reform efforts. Procedural rights like notice,
for example, undermine the case for sanctions.359 Treating these rights as
mere annoyances to be tossed aside would surely constitute poetic justice for
former officials like John Yoo who show rights similar disdain. However, it
would compromise a transition back to the rule of law.360 Grand structural
overhauls like Ackerman’s Supreme Executive Tribunal would undermine
the separation of powers that ensures democratic accountability.361 The
result would be the worst of both worlds: the rigidity of the courts coupled
with the strategic behavior that typifies the political branches.
Decisional approaches that modify the substantive standard and
deliberative processes of OLC have the most promise. Disclosure is a vital
safeguard for responsible deliberation, while stare decisis is often a valuable
aid to stability and the rule of law.362 However, these decisional approaches
also have perils: an absolutist objective standard, for example, breaks down
in practice, given the imperatives that national security lawyers confront in

353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
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362.

See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 5–11 and accompanying text.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text.
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See supra notes 114–22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114–39 and accompanying text.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part V.B.
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episodes such as the destroyer deal with Britain.363 Mandating the analysis
of counterarguments can be either an inadequate constraint, as in the case of
advice to commit genocide, or a subjective factor that varies with the
evaluator’s opposition to an opinion’s substantive conclusions.364
To address the risks of procedural injustice, paralysis, and polarization,
this Article has proposed a model of dialogic equipoise.365 The model
recognizes that OLC is an important player in American constitutionalism,
which must balance the need to conserve institutional capital with the need
to spend that capital in exigent circumstances. OLC must maintain capital
with two crucial audiences: the legal community, including the courts, which
must believe that OLC can constrain the President, and the President, who
can go elsewhere for advice if OLC mistakes risk aversion for the rule of
law.366 To facilitate this balance, this Article has proposed a hybrid
approach that combines a substantive standard with a deliberative
approach.367 OLC may issue opinions that expand executive power and
fulfill three criteria: the opinions must address sovereignty- or human rightscentered problems, be reasonably likely to obtain ratification, and respect
independent constitutional guarantees.368 The substantive standard assures
that opinions expanding executive power will respond to grave exigencies
and will be subject to timely disclosure.369 At the same time, a cap will limit
issuance of such opinions, encouraging OLC to marshal its institutional
capital for those occasions when no alternatives will do the job.370
The dialogic equipoise approach will not please everyone. Those who
see formal sanctions as a prerequisite for a successful transition will regard
anything less as a failure of accountability. Champions of structural change
will see the proposal here as an inadequate response to a fundamental
problem. However, perhaps these critics, like the officials whose work they
rightly deplore, are prisoners of an unduly parsimonious narrative. Vice
President Cheney and his acolytes viewed the last quarter century as a saga
of the Presidency hobbled by legal requirements.371 Ackerman tells the tale
just as starkly, but with the opposite trajectory, as a story of the Presidency
undermining legal restraints.372 Between these competing narratives, an
approach like dialogic equipoise can help OLC do its crucial work.
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